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FUNCTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN 3-D 
 
ALEJANDRO E. CAMACHO∗ and ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN∗∗ 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The creation of new administrative agencies and the realignment of 
existing governmental authority are commonplace and high-stakes events, 
as illustrated by the recent creation of the Department of Homeland 
Security after 9/11 and of new financial regulatory agencies after the 
global recession of 2009.  Scholars and policymakers have not devoted 
sufficient attention to this subject, failing to clearly identify the different 
dimensions along which government authority may be structured or to 
consider the relationships among them.  Analysis of these institutional 
design issues typically also gives short shrift to whether authority should 
be allocated differently based on agency function.  These failures have 
contributed to reorganization efforts that have proven ill-suited to 
achieving policymakers’ goals due to mismatches between the perceived 
defects of existing structures and the allocations of authority chosen to 
replace them.  This Article introduces a framework for assessing how 
governmental authority may be structured along three dimensions: 
centralization, overlap, and coordination.  Using examples from diverse 
policy areas including national security, financial markets, and 
environmental protection, it demonstrates how differentiating among these 
dimensions and among particular governmental functions better 
illuminates the advantages and disadvantages of available structural 
options.  Though recognizing that the optimal allocation of authority is 
inexorably context-specific, the Article concludes with preliminary 
observations about how certain allocations of authority are likely to better 
promote important social policy goals than others.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The creation of new programs and administrative agencies and the 
realignment of existing governmental authority are commonplace.  Within 
just the past decade, high-profile reorganizations have followed the events 
of 9/11 (which led to the massive reshuffling that accompanied the 
creation of the Department of Homeland Security), 1  the Deepwater 
Horizon explosion (which prompted the reallocation of regulatory 
authority over offshore oil exploration and development),2 and the late-
2000s global recession (which led to the creation of the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the 
merging of the Office of Thrift Supervision into the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency).3  As in these instances, these changes often 
occur in response to crisis,4 though the prompt for program creation or 
                                                 
1
 See generally Dara Kay Cohen, Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar & Barry R. Weingast, 
Crisis Bureaucracy: Homeland Security and the Political Design of Legal Mandate, 59 
STAN. L. REV. 673, 718 (2006); Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart 
Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CAL. L. 
REV. 1655 (2006). 
2
 See Secretary of the Interior, Order No. 3299 (May 19, 2010); Reorganization of The 
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement, 
http://www.boemre.gov.   
3
 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010).  According to two observers, “it is the rare President that does not 
propose to reorganize some part of the federal government.”  David A. Hyman & 
William E. Kovacic, Government Organization/Reorganization: Why Who Does What 
Matters, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2110351, at 2.   
 Other notable reorganization initiatives in just the past year include a 2013 Executive 
Order to coordinate agency efforts to reduce cyber risks to critical infrastructure, 
Improving Critical Infrastructure (Feb. 12, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/02/12/executive-order-improving-critical-infrastructure-cybersecurity; a 2012 
proposal to merge the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission into a new Securities and Derivatives Commission, H.R. 6613, 
112th Cong. (2012); the creation in 2009 and rapid elimination in 2012 of a new Center 
on Climate Change and National Security within the Central Intelligence Agency, John 
M. Broder, C.I.A. Closes Its Climate Change Office, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2012); a 2012 
proposal to increase coordination among seven federal agencies responsible for 
conducting space weather research under the supervision of the National Science and 
Technology Council, Statement of Daniel N. Baker before the Subcommittee on Space 
and Aeronautics Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of 
Representatives (Nov. 28, 2012), 
http://science.house.gov/sites/republicans.science.house.gov/files/documents/HHRG-
112-SY16-WState-DBaker-20121128.pdf; and a 2011 proposal to create new regional 
information and response entities to increase coordination among federal and state 
agencies in addressing cancer clusters, S. 76, 112th Cong. (2011).  See also infra notes 9-
20 and accompanying text (describing another important recent reorganization proposal). 
4
 See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 
125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1152 (2012) (“The most significant government reorganization 
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government reorganization sometimes has been the gradual recognition of 
deficiencies in existing regulatory programs.5   
Scholars and policymakers alike have devoted considerable attention 
to the proper allocation of governmental authority, traditionally focusing 
on the appropriate scale of government (and in particular on federalism).6  
Over the past decade, some scholars have analyzed the appropriateness of 
jurisdictional overlap.7  More recently, others have sought to account for 
the value of coordination among agencies.8  However, these debates over 
governmental configuration have insufficiently focused on the 
relationships among these different dimensions of authority.  Additionally, 
such discussions typically ignore whether the fitness of a particular 
allocation should depend on the governmental function being exercised.  
                                                                                                                         
of the last fifty years occurred after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, when 
Congress opted to combine scores of agencies into a DHS, a new ‘mega-agency.’”).  
5
 The shift of environmental regulatory authority from the states to the federal 
government during the 1970s is a prominent example.  See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE 
MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 67 (2004). 
6
 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987); 
Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of Powers, 112 
COLUM. L. REV. 459 (2012); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: 
Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Daniel Esty, Revitalizing 
Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996) [hereinafter Esty, 
Environmental Federalism]; Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 
74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1495, 1562 (1999) [hereinafter Esty, Environmental Governance]; 
Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism and Federal Agency Reform, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1 
(2011); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race 
to the Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation," 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1210 (1992); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in 
Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196 
(1977).  
7
 See, e.g., PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S 
CORE QUESTION (Cambridge U. Press 2009, William W. Buzbee ed.); ROBERT A. 
SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM (Columbia U. Press 2009); David E. Adelman & 
Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case Against Reallocating Environmental 
Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796 (2007); Ann Carlson, Iterative Federalism 
and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097 (2009); William W. Buzbee, Recognizing 
the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2003); J.R. 
DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Public Agencies as Lobbyists, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2217 
(2005); Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in 
Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159 (2006); Heather K. Gerken, Federalism All the 
Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2010); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, 
Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling 
Away, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 59 (2010). 
8
 See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, The Visible Hand: Coordination Functions of the 
Regulatory State, 95 MINN. L. REV. 578 (2010); Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do: 
How to Deal with the Dysfunctions of Multiple-Goal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
1 (2009); Keith Bradley, The Design of Agency Interactions, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 745 
(2011); Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4. 
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We use the word function to refer to the nature of the authority engaged in 
by, or the role assigned to, an agency (such as monitoring, information 
dissemination, financing, planning, standard setting, or enforcement), as 
opposed to the substantive subject matter of the agency’s delegated 
authority.  This Article addresses these neglected dimensional and 
functional aspects of the analysis of allocating authority and sheds light on 
how these features illuminate the policy tradeoffs among alternative 
structural designs. 
A recent reorganization proposal concerning small business regulation 
serves as a useful introduction to the Article’s multi-dimensional and 
functional analysis.  In 2012, President Obama proposed to consolidate six 
agencies into a single new Department that would more efficiently 
promote competitiveness, exports, and American business. 9    The six 
agencies – the business and trade functions of the U.S. Department of 
Commerce, the Small Business Administration, the Office of the U.S. 
Trade Representative, the Export-Import Bank, the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation, and the U.S. Trade and Development Agency – 
all focus primarily on business and trade.  The White House and others10 
explained that overlapping responsibilities among these agencies had 
made it hard for small businesses to interact with the government and 
contributed to “unnecessary waste and duplication.”11  To address these 
concerns, the Obama proposal would centralize authority by integrating 
the programs of the six eliminated agencies into four divisions of the new 
Department.  The Administration and congressional allies asserted that 
this consolidation would create a more efficient and effective structure for 
promoting American business by eliminating duplication and overlap12 
                                                 
9
 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, President Obama Announces Proposal 
to Reform, Reorganize and Consolidate Government (Jan. 13, 2012) [hereinafter 
Consolidate Government], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2012/01/13/president-obama-announces-proposal-reform-reorganize-and-
consolidate-gov.  The proposal was introduced in different forms in the Senate and the 
House of Representatives in 2012.  See S. 2129, 112th Cong. (2012); H.R. 4409, 112th 
Cong. (2012).  Though the bill has yet to advance to a vote, the Obama Administration 
intends to support the proposals in the 113th Congress.  See Al Kamen, The secretary of 
what, now?, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 2012. 
10
 See Statement of Sen. Tom Carper at hearings on “Retooling Government for the 21st 
Century: The President's Reorganization Plan and Reducing Duplication” (Mar. 21, 
2012), at 2, http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/retooling-government-for-the-21st-
century-the-presidents-reorganization-plan-and-reducing-duplication (describing 
undesirable duplication created by the existence of multiple agencies “that produce 
statistical output as a part of their programmatic responsibilities”). 
11
 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Government Reorganization Fact 
Sheet (Jan. 13, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2012/01/13/government-reorganization-fact-sheet. 
12
 See, e.g., Consolidate Government, supra note 9; Testimony of Daniel Werfel, 
Controller, Office of Management and Budget, Before the Committee on Homeland 
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and increasing coordination.13  The Department would also create “a one-
stop shop for everything from financing and export promotion to patent 
protection and help commercializing innovative discoveries,” allowing 
small business owners to work with one agency in receiving “the core 
Government services that will help them compete, grow, and hire.”14 
Unfortunately, like so many other reorganizations, the 
Administration’s proposal conflates the three distinctive dimensions of 
authority identified by this Article—the extent of centralization, overlap, 
and coordination of authority among agencies—and as a result fails to 
propose a structure that is likely to directly address the Administration’s 
underlying concerns.  The expressed intent of this proposed reorganization 
is to minimize overlap in agency authority and increase coordination.  
However, the proposed solution is poorly designed to promote those goals 
because it focuses on reallocating authority along one dimension of 
authority—the centralization of the responsibilities of six agencies into a 
single new Department—even though the purported problems relate to 
agency structure and relationships along two entirely different dimensions 
(unnecessary overlap and lack of interagency coordination).  Centralizing 
authority may or may not decrease the overlap of authority or increase the 
level of agency coordination.  The proposed new Department, in fact, 
would be comprised of four divisions (small business, trade and 
investment, technology and innovation, and statistics) with seemingly 
overlapping jurisdictions.15   Conversely, though decentralized authority 
can also overlap, it need not do so.16  For example, duplication among 
decentralized institutions can be reduced without centralizing authority if 
the jurisdiction of existing agencies is redefined so that each agency has 
distinct rather than overlapping responsibilities.  Similarly, both 
centralized and decentralized allocations of authority can be highly 
                                                                                                                         
Security and Government Affairs, U.S. Senate, March 21, 2012, at hearings on 
“Retooling Government for the 21st Century: The President’s Reorganization Plan and 
Reducing Duplication” (Mar. 21, 2012), at 4, 
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/retooling-government-for-the-21st-century-the-
presidents-reorganization-plan-and-reducing-duplication; Reorganization Fact Sheet, 
supra note 11. 
13
 See, e.g., Statement of Sen. Tom Carper at hearings on “Retooling Government for the 
21st Century: The President's Reorganization Plan and Reducing Duplication” (Mar. 21, 
2012), at 2, http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/retooling-government-for-the-21st-
century-the-presidents-reorganization-plan-and-reducing-duplication. 
14
 Testimony of Daniel Werfel, supra note 12, at 4. 
15
 For example, the small business and statistics divisions may have overlapping authority 
over statistics pertaining to small businesses, and the small business and trade and 
investment divisions may have overlapping jurisdiction over trade and investment issues 
pertaining to small businesses.   
16
 See infra Part IV.B.1. 
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coordinated or independent. 17   It is possible to require increased 
coordination among multiple agencies without centralization of authority 
or reduction in the number of agencies with relevant jurisdiction.  By 
conflating coordinated and distinct authority with centralization, the 
Administration’s proposal missed an opportunity to tailor its 
reorganization to actually fix the perceived flaws of the existing 
government structure.   
In addition to these dimensions of governmental authority, the Obama 
reorganization proposal highlights another feature of governmental 
organization that is often overlooked—functional jurisdiction.  Regulatory 
authority is organized not only substantively but also on the basis of 
different governmental functions.18  Three of the divisions proposed for 
the new Department would be organized around substantive authority—
the small business, trade and investment, and technology and innovation 
divisions—while the remaining one would be organized around an 
information-gathering function—the production and analysis of statistics.  
As this Article explains, focusing on functional jurisdiction provides a 
number of key insights.  For one, two government agencies with 
substantive authority over the same issue—for example, small 
businesses—will not have overlapping authority if their functions are 
distinct.  The small business division, for instance, may be charged with 
planning, standard-setting, and implementation functions regarding small 
businesses, while the statistics division may be charged with information 
gathering on those small businesses.  Functional division among multiple 
agencies with jurisdiction over the same subject therefore can reduce 
duplication even without centralization of agency authority. 
Focusing on the largely neglected functional aspect of organization 
and clearly delineating the differences among the three dimensions of 
authority provides further valuable insights.  In particular, this Article 
demonstrates that the optimal organizational structure along the three 
dimensions is likely to differ depending on the particular governmental 
function at issue. 19   It may make sense, for example, to centralize 
information gathering authority (such as in the proposed small business 
division for production and analysis of statistics) but create a decentralized 
but coordinated structure for program implementation (such as by 
retaining separate agencies for facilitating trade by and investment in 
small businesses).  As with many prior regulatory design reforms, the 
Obama reorganization proposal’s conflation of the dimensions of authority 
and inattention to functional jurisdiction obscured the tradeoffs that 
different reorganization options entail.  Organizational choices along each 
                                                 
17
 See infra Part IV.B.2. 
18
 See infra Part II. 
19
 See infra Part IV.A. 
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of the three dimensions will involve (and be informed by) a different set of 
policy tradeoffs that are impossible to disaggregate if the existence of 
three different dimensions and the availability of different configurations 
based on function are not appreciated. 
Analysis of the structures, jurisdictions, and relationships among 
governmental institutions is vital to understanding and promoting their 
efficacy at advancing public goals.20  Yet institutional design questions 
such as these are regularly overlooked, misanalyzed, or oversimplified.21 
Given the recurrence of government reorganization efforts and the high-
stakes consequences they may entail, this Article provides an analytical 
framework for assessing when realignment of agency authority is likely to 
be beneficial and how it ought to proceed when circumstances warrant it.  
Using examples from a range of regulatory areas, it demonstrates how 
differentiating the choices of when to centralize, create overlap, and 
require coordination among governmental institutions illuminates the 
advantages and disadvantages of competing reorganization options.  The 
Article also explains how focusing on the particular governmental 
function at issue further clarifies the advantages and disadvantages of 
movement along the three dimensions of centralization, overlap, and 
coordination. 
The Article proceeds in four Parts.  Part I briefly describes the 
principal values that tend to be implicated in government reorganization 
efforts and that may be useful in assessing the merits of a particular 
                                                 
20
 As Professor Magill has succinctly put it, “institutions matter.”  Elizabeth Magill, 
Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 859, 903 (2009).  See also Jason 
Marisam, Interagency Administration, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2013), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2137151, at 2 (arguing that “agency interconnectedness will 
become even more rooted in the bureaucracy over time, as regulatory problems show no 
sign of becoming simpler and more amenable to single-agency solutions”). 
21
 As stated by Dean Phil Weiser: 
The question of how to design and operate public institutions is often relegated 
to a second order consideration and takes a backseat to the analysis of 
substantive policy issues. . . . In particular, few commentators or policymakers 
have focused on the question of what institutional strategy, structure, or set of 
processes . . . to use and how any such regime would operate in practice. 
 The impact of institutional issues as an influence on the ultimate success of 
an agency is grossly underappreciated. . . . Consequently, any focus on agency 
effectiveness needs to ask how an agency is doing its work and not merely what 
work it purports to be doing. Indeed, even the best-crafted statutory or 
regulatory regime will fail if the institutional structure, processes, and culture 
undermine the ability to implement the regime's goals effectively. 
Philip J. Weiser, Towards an International Dialogue on the Institutional Side of Antitrust, 
66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 445, 447-48 (2011) (citations omitted).  See also Hyman 
& Kovacic, supra note 3, at 5 (noting that legal scholars have largely ignored issues 
concerning “what an agency is assigned to do and where it is located”). 
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initiative.  Parts II and III provide a taxonomy of the different means of 
allocating (and reallocating) authority among government entities.  Part II 
highlights a key but underappreciated distinction between the substantive 
jurisdiction of regulators and the locus of control over different 
governmental functions — what we call functional jurisdiction.  Affording 
attention to functional jurisdiction provides insights about the policy and 
value tradeoffs among available options for allocating government 
authority that may otherwise be obscured.  Part III delineates the 
dimensions of primary importance for characterizing allocation of 
regulatory authority — the extent to which jurisdiction is centralized or 
decentralized, overlapping or distinct, and coordinated or independent.   
Part IV illustrates the utility of the analytical framework introduced in 
Parts II and III, using a range of examples.  Many of the examples involve 
environmental regulation and natural resource management.  We believe, 
however, that the analysis in this Article is relevant to any form of 
government organization, as examples from fields of regulation and 
government activity such as financial markets, health care, and national 
security illustrate.  We derive three key lessons about the role of 
functional jurisdiction and the value of clearly distinguishing among the 
different dimensions of governmental authority.  First, Part IV discusses 
how both policymakers and the substantial federalism and governance 
literature have largely both neglected the significance of functional 
jurisdiction and conflated the dimensions identified in Part III in analyzing 
the relative merit of alternative governmental structures.  Second, it 
explains how our focus on functional jurisdiction enriches the analysis of 
the most promising ways to allocate governmental authority along a 
different combination of dimensions based on the agency function 
involved. Third, Part IV illustrates how crisp delineations among the 
various dimensions of governmental authority clarify the analysis of the 
tradeoffs among the policy values discussed in Part I that alternative 
organizational options entail.  By using this analytical framework, 
policymakers will be better able to select the government structure that 
strikes an appropriate balance among competing or conflicting values.   
Undoubtedly, the appropriate choices along each of the dimensions, 
and decisions on whether to differentiate structure based on function, will 
necessarily be context-specific. We nonetheless conclude by providing a 
set of preliminary observations about the relative merits of different 
dimensional allocations of authority for each governmental function.  We 
assert that arguments for centralization and coordination are likely to be 
more persuasive for certain kinds of agency research, information 
distribution, and financing functions. We also posit that, in general, 
arguments for decentralized authority usually will be strongest for 
implementation and enforcement functions, and to a lesser extent 
planning.  Likewise, though the considerable calls for increased 
coordination among regulatory authorities may often be persuasive for 
8  
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functions such as financing, information distribution, planning, and even 
standard setting, we assert that the benefits from maintaining regulator 
independence and even competition will typically be stronger for agencies 
performing implementation and enforcement functions. Finally, although 
we largely concur with the growing literature promoting the value of 
shared substantive jurisdiction, we postulate that providing for distinct 
functional jurisdiction will often provide opportunities to maintain the 
advantages of redundancy while minimizing its disadvantages. 
I. NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS FOR ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY  
Determining how best to allocate the authority to design and 
implement government programs requires a comparative assessment of the 
extent to which alternative allocations promote desired normative values 
or considerations.  We use four such evaluative yardsticks in the 
discussion below:  effectiveness, efficiency, equity, and legitimacy. 22  
When these measures point in different directions, determining the optimal 
balance requires choosing among allocations that promote some but not 
other values better than the available alternatives. 
A. Effectiveness  
An effective regulatory design is one that achieves the identified 
regulatory goals.23  A regulatory program that fails to achieve its goals 
cannot be deemed a success even if it operates efficiently and fairly and is 
administered by accountable officials.24 The effectiveness of a government 
program may depend not only on how governmental authority is allocated, 
but also on whether it is feasible to achieve the identified goals and 
whether sufficient resources are available to government officials to 
implement the program.25   Our focus is on the impact of government 
structure on program effectiveness. 
                                                 
22
 Administrative law scholars have used similar metrics to evaluate regulatory programs.  
See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton, Administrative Procedure Reform: The Effects of S. 1663 on 
the Conduct of Federal Rate Proceedings, 16 ADMIN. L. REV. 108, 111-12 (1964) 
(offering accuracy, efficiency, and acceptability to agency, participants, and the public as 
metrics). 
23
 Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1150. 
24
 Cf. Sidney A. Shapiro, A Delegation Theory of the APA, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 89, 
107 (1996) (referring to effectiveness as an administrative process value). 
25
 See, e.g., Richard Briffault, A Government for Our Time? Business Improvement 
Districts and Urban Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 365, 460 (1999) (discussing 
relevance of resource adequacy to effectiveness of regulation); Sidney A. Shapiro, 
Agency Priority Setting and the Review of Existing Agency Rules, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 370, 
374 (1996). 
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B. Efficiency 
Assuming multiple options of equal efficacy exist, some may operate 
more efficiently than others.  Efficiency is relevant to the assessment of 
institutional design, and involves comparing the administrative costs a 
program imposes on government and the compliance costs imposed on the 
private sector. 26   For example, the costs of administering redundant 
structures “represent lost funds for other tasks. In other words, if resources 
are fixed, redundant structures impose additional opportunity costs.”27 
C. Equity 
Although the concept of equity involves distributional considerations, 
there are different ways to determine whether a particular allocation of 
societal benefits and burdens is fair.28  Policy analysts of regulatory issues 
sometimes use equity to refer to everything other than efficiency.29  Dan 
Farber has used the term to include “any standard for determining the just 
distribution of resources.” 30   One widely used distinction is between 
distributive and corrective justice.  The former deals with the allocation of 
desirable resources in proportion to the “possession of some morally 
relevant characteristic” such as humanity (which supports an egalitarian 
distribution) or virtue (which favors some more than others).31  Corrective 
(or compensatory) justice “seeks to correct transactional wrongs” by 
requiring wrongdoers to compensate those whom they harm,32  and may 
turn on whether mere causation is sufficient to trigger a compensatory 
obligation or whether fault is also required.33  Making matters even more 
                                                 
26
 Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1181-82.  Efforts to improve efficiency seek to 
“minimize the administrative costs of enforcement.”  Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas 
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 
85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1093 (1972). 
27
 O’Connell, supra note 1, at 1680. 
28
 See CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, THE GNAT IS OLDER THAN MAN: GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 
AND HUMAN AGENDA 252 (1993) (discussing the “difficulties of sorting through . . . 
competing standards of ‘fairness’ to find the morally right one”). 
29
 See, e.g., Wallace Wen-Yeu Wang, Financial Institutions in Taiwan: An Analysis of 
the Regulatory Scheme, 4 J. CHINESE L. 3, 33 (1990); Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Goals of 
Antitrust: Other than Competition and Efficiency, What Else Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 
1191, 1192 (1977).  But cf. Douglas Kysar, Sustainable Development and Private Global 
Governance, 83 TEX. L. REV. 2109, 2160 (2005) (discussing market liberalism’s “view 
that efficiency, equity, and sustainability are separable goals”). 
30
 Daniel A. Farber, What (If Anything) Can Economics Say About Equity?, 101 MICH. L. 
REV. 1791, 1794 (2003). 
31
 Nathan B. Oman, The Honor of Private Law, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 31, 38 (2011).  See 
also STONE, supra note 28, at 247-48 (describing distributive justice as dealing with 
“situational disparities,” not actions). 
32
 Oman, supra note 31, at 38. 
33
 Id. 
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complex, distributional concerns may arise in several guises, including 
vertical,34 horizontal,35 geographical,36 and temporal.37     
D. Legitimacy 
Although there is broad consensus that legitimacy is a core 
administrative law concern, and thus bears on the structure of 
government, 38  legitimacy encompasses multiple considerations, which 
scholars define and assess differently.39  We focus here on the aspects of 
legitimacy most relevant to assessing alternative ways to organize 
government.  Legitimacy may be defined as “the acceptability of [a] 
                                                 
34
 Vertical equity implicates “the fairness of the distribution of wealth among different 
income groups.”  Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and 
Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L. J. 385, 415 (1977).  A disaster preparedness plan that 
facilitated evacuation of affected wealthy but not poor neighborhoods would raise 
vertical equity concerns. Vertical equity concerns are the focus of the environmental 
justice movement, which posits that all persons are equally entitled to protection from 
environmental harm.  ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK, FACING CATASTROPHE: ENVIRONMENTAL 
ACTION FOR A POST-KATRINA WORLD 118 (2010). 
35
 “Horizontal equity requires government to treat like persons alike.”  Ellickson, supra 
note 34, at 415.  A plan that required individuals of similar income levels to pay different 
amounts to finance protection measures, on the basis of some characteristic unrelated to 
the degree of benefit individuals would accrue from the plan, would invoke horizontal 
equity concerns.   
36
 Geographic concerns may arise from a regime that concentrates health and safety risks 
in a particular location, such as the area surrounding a waste disposal facility or a high-
volume pollution source.   
37
 Temporal equity deals with “the preservation or defeat of expectation interests.”  
RICHARD B. STEWART & JAMES B. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: 
READINGS, MATERIALS AND NOTES 168 (1978).  Temporal concerns, for example, may 
arise when a government program foists costs on future generations that will not be able 
to enjoy the benefits of the resource allocations that produce those costs.  See generally 
Neil H. Buchanan, What Kind of Environment Do We Owe Future Generations?, 5 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 339 (2011).  These concerns would be implicated, for example, 
if the government chose to indefinitely forestall taking steps to avoid damage caused by 
the activities of the present generation, even though it would be far more expensive to 
resolve the issue on a deferred basis.  
38
 See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy 
in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 462 (2003) (“From the birth of the 
administrative state, we have struggled to describe our regulatory government as the 
legitimate child of a constitutional democracy.”); Sidney A. Shapiro, et al., The 
Enlightenment of Administrative Law: Looking Inside the Agency for Legitimacy, 47 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 463, 463 (2012) (“The history of administrative law in the United 
States constitutes a series of ongoing attempts to legitimize unelected public 
administration in a constitutional liberal democracy.”). 
39
 See Shapiro, et al., supra note 38, at 466 (“Legitimacy is a notoriously treacherous 
concept.”). 
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regulation to those involved in its development,” 40  which may be 
enhanced through the availability of opportunities for public 
participation.41  Social psychologists contend that participation enhances 
perceptions of legitimacy “independently of whether outcomes ultimately 
favor . . . participants.”42   In addition, opportunities to participate are 
consistent with democratic government.43     
The legitimacy of a regulatory system also turns on the degree to 
which it protects against deviation from legislative goals due to capture of 
regulators by special interests.44  Regulators with conflicts of interest are 
especially vulnerable to capture. 45   Procedural mechanisms such as 
transparency and opportunities to participate can combat capture.46  So, 
too, can the availability of judicial review, which may be invoked by 
stakeholders to prevent those implementing regulatory programs from 
straying beyond legislative bounds. 
Similarly, perceptions that decision makers are honest, unbiased47 and 
competent promote legitimacy.48  In addition, assigning tasks to those with 
                                                 
40
 Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit, 
9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 60, 63 (2000). 
41
 Transparency also promotes legitimacy because it “tends both to improve the quality of 
decisions and to facilitate accountability to the electorate.”  William H. Simon, 
Democracy and Organization: The Further Reformation of American Administrative Law, 
at 4, 7-8, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2175121 (arguing that transparency fosters “openness 
to ongoing diffuse democratic pressures”). 
42
 Freeman & Langbein, supra note 40, at 67 (citing E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, 
THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988)). 
43
 See id.  at 133 (noting that broad participation and inclusiveness are generally laudable 
goals and that, “all things being equal,” greater participation is more consistent with 
democratic values than less participation).  Cynthia Farina has called government 
decision making that reflects the “will of the people” “the wellspring of legitimacy.”  
Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Simple Rules for a Complex World, 72 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987, 990 (1997).  Government processes that are fair enhance 
“identification with, and commitment to, the legal-political system.”  Id. at 1035. 
44
 Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1185-87 (addressing the risks of capture of 
agencies).  A captured agency seeks to promote the agenda of those to which it is 
beholden, even if that agenda deviates from statutory goals.  
45
 See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC’s Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency’s 
Authority and Present a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and Consumer 
Protection,  23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 232 (2004). 
46
 Roberta S. Karmel & Claire R. Kelly, The Hardening of Soft Law in Securities 
Regulation, 34 BROOK. J. INTL. L. 883, 946 (2009). 
47
 Farina, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 1035. 
48
 Legitimacy is the result of public confidence in the competence and trustworthiness of 
officials.   Terence R. Mitchell & William G. Scott, Leadership Failures, the Distrusting 
Public, and Prospects of the Administrative State, 47 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 445, 446 (1987).  
Vesting decision-making authority in those with expertise on issues within their 
jurisdiction can enhance the perception of competence, and therefore foster legitimacy. 
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expertise and providing them the tools to perform such tasks can also 
increase the likelihood that programs will operate effectively, illustrating 
that the four values we have identified are inter-related and may overlap.49  
Likewise, the requirement that agencies provide reasons for their decisions 
that are based on facts and rooted in the agencies’ statutory authority 
provide constraints that promote legitimacy.50   
E. Balancing Values in Allocating Government Authority 
 The four evaluative yardsticks discussed above are not meant to be an 
exclusive recitation of the values implicated by government organization 
or reorganization.  They are among the most important measures for 
assessing an allocation of governmental authority, however.  In rare 
instances, all four criteria may support a particular allocation.  Most of the 
time, however, an initiative designed to promote one of the measures is 
likely to adversely affect one or more of the others.51  The proper balance 
among the four criteria identified here will necessarily be context-
specific.52  For example, it may be preferable to sacrifice some degree of 
effectiveness if the most effective option among several that promise to 
achieve regulatory goals at least partially is also harshly inequitable or 
vests in decision-makers authority that threatens legitimacy.  These kinds 
of tradeoffs of course are common under the American system of 
government.53  As long as the yardsticks are clearly identified and the 
                                                 
49
 See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1185 (arguing that programs capable of 
improving analysis by adding data and expertise are “likely to make decisions better”).  
Another overlap involves consistent treatment of similarly situated entities, which 
promotes both a sense of non-arbitrariness (and therefore of legitimacy) and of fair 
treatment. 
50
 This requirement of “deliberation” enhances accountability by guarding against 
arbitrariness.  David L. Markell & Emily Hammond Meazell, Administrative Proxies for 
Judicial Review: Building Legitimacy from the Inside-Out, at 4, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2127838.  The reasons requirement provides evidence of a 
commitment to rationality.  Id. at 14. 
51
 See, e.g., Eric Biber, The More the Merrier: Multiple Agencies and the Future of 
Administrative Law Scholarship, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 78 (2012), 
http://www.harvardlawreview.org/issues/125/march12/forum_868.php#_ftnref: (“So long 
as there are multiple things for the government to do, there will always be a question 
about what organizational structure will allow it to be most successful in dealing with the 
interactions among . . . different goals.”). 
52
 Accountability, for example, “guarantees responsiveness, although not necessarily 
effectiveness.”  Id. at  1719. 
53
 See, e.g., Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983) 
(stating that “the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in 
facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the 
Constitution.  Convenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives – or the 
hallmarks – of democratic government . . . .”); id. at 958-59 (stating that “the Framers 
ranked other values higher than efficiency.”).  The Court, in striking down the legislative 
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impact of a particular allocation on each is assessed, policymakers will be 
able to make informed decisions on the best way to achieve an appropriate 
balance among them.  Parts III through V below illustrate in more detail 
the kinds of tradeoffs likely to be implicated in choosing among possible 
allocations of authority. 
II. SUBSTANTIVE AND FUNCTIONAL ALLOCATIONS OF AUTHORITY 
Regulatory authority can be assigned in two different ways.  First, an 
agency’s jurisdiction can be determined on the basis of the subject matter 
it is authorized to regulate or manage (such as activities that result in air 
pollution or mineral extraction on public lands).  Second, jurisdiction can 
be defined in terms of the functions an agency performs, such that 
different agencies may be responsible for performing discrete tasks (such 
as standard-setting, permitting, and enforcement) within the same 
substantive area. For example, as illustrated in Figure 1 below, although 
federal pollution control authority could be apportioned into substantive 
silos according to the particular type of resource (e.g., air, water, or solid 
waste), such authority could also be divided into functional categories 
according to the governmental activity at issue (e.g., standard setting, 
permitting, and enforcement).  Alternatively (and more commonly), a 
legislature or administrative agency might adopt a hybrid of substantive 
and functional allocations in creating or reorganizing authority, in which 
agencies are only provided authority over certain regulatory functions for 
particular types of resources or regulatory problems.54  
                                                                                                                         
veto in Chadha, emphasized the Framers’ choice to sacrifice efficient for accountable, 
democratic government through the imposition of requirements such as bicameralism and 
presentment.  Id. at 959. 
54
 See infra notes 69-74 and accompanying text (describing organization of EPA and the 
Internal Revenue Service).  
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Figure 1.  Substantive and Functional Jurisdiction 
 
In characterizing governmental jurisdiction, primary attention tends to 
be given to evaluating agency management based on the scope of the 
substantive authority of the governmental entity.  However, regulatory 
authority is also consistently apportioned based on the function or 
functions that a particular governmental institution may exercise.  Though 
some scholars have noted the existence of division of authority along 
functional lines, 55  the significance of this component is considerably 
underappreciated in the regulatory design literature.56  
A. Substantive Jurisdiction 
Perhaps the most elementary component for assessing how authority is 
allocated in the management of environmental problems is substantive 
jurisdiction.  Administrative agencies are allocated limited substantive 
authority to regulate or manage specific social issues or problems.  
Workplace health and safety falls within the purview of the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration.  The U.S. Department of Agriculture 
deals with the agriculture industry.  Transportation infrastructure is 
                                                 
55
 Scholars investigating government organization who do refer to agency functions 
frequently do so in a different sense than we are using that term.  Rather than focusing on 
the different kinds of tasks agencies perform, these scholars use functions to describe the 
scope of an agency’s substantive jurisdiction (such as the authority to regulate air 
pollution, but not water pollution).  See, e.g., Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 3, at 25 
(discussing the allocation of authority among three agencies to provide services for 
veterans). 
56
 See infra Part IV.A.1. 
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addressed by the Federal Highway Administration and the Department of 
Transportation.  Immigration is an activity supervised by the U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services.  The Interstate Commerce 
Commission, before Congress abolished it, managed interstate commerce 
such as transportation of goods by rail. The Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention conduct disease research and coordinate disease prevention 
measures.   The Federal Emergency Management Agency is charged with 
conducting disaster planning and management. 
In environmental regulation, administrative authority is typically 
restricted to regulation or management of a particular environmental 
medium or waste.  Federally designated wetlands are regulated by the 
United States Army Corps of Engineers; air quality and non-nuclear 
hazardous and solid waste are regulated by the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) and state air agencies; the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission and Department of Energy control nuclear power generation 
and waste management.   
Regularly, substantive authority is divided based on particular features 
or components of a medium.  For example, surface water quality is 
regulated by EPA and designated state water quality agencies (such as 
California’s State Water Resources Control Board), while the allocation of 
water supply falls within the domains of different state and local water 
resources agencies (such as the California Department of Water Resources 
and Metropolitan Water District of Southern California).  Similarly, 
management of terrestrial or freshwater (including endangered or 
threatened) species is under the jurisdiction of the Interior Department’s 
United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), while marine (including 
endangered or threatened) species are managed by the Commerce 
Department’s National Marine Fisheries Service.  Public land 
management is divided based on particular land management goals.  At 
the federal level alone, the national forests are managed by the United 
States Forest Service (USFS), the national parks by the National Park 
Service (NPS), wildlife refuges by the FWS, and federal lands not 
otherwise specified by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM).  Each of 
these land management agencies is guided by a different management 
standard, with the NPS and the FWS being charged primarily with the 
duty to preserve natural resources and provide recreational opportunities, 
while the USFS and the BLM are required to promote a broader range of 
multiple uses of the lands under their jurisdiction.57 
Such division, of course, is not unique to pollution control or natural 
resources law.  Drugs, cosmetics, and some food products are generally 
                                                 
57
 See 1 GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL 
RESOURCES LAW §§ 6:14-6:17 (West 2d ed. 2007). 
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regulated by the Food and Drug Administration, while other foods (meat, 
poultry, and processed egg products) are under the jurisdiction of the 
United States Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection 
Service.58  General product safety is regulated by the Federal Consumer 
Product Safety Commission, while pesticide licensing is administered by 
EPA.59  The Dodd-Frank Act60 vested authority to regulate providers of 
consumer financial products and services, including insured banks, 
savings and loans, and large credit unions, in one agency, but delegated to 
a different agency regulatory control over smaller depository institutions, 
and retained authority in still other agencies to regulate transactions in 
securities and commodities futures.61  In addition, “informational privacy 
is governed by a variety of different laws, administered by different 
agencies . . . setting forth divergent requirements governing the treatment 
of information by type and business sector.”62   
Relatedly, substantive authority may be delegated to a particular 
authority in recognition of that agency’s technical expertise that may be 
brought to bear on the regulatory problem.  For example, an expertise in 
atmospheric chemistry is useful for understanding and regulating air 
quality, an ecology background for managing biological resources, a 
public health or medical background for disease prevention, or forestry 
expertise for forest management. 63   California has vested multiple 
agencies with authority to regulate different aspects of the electric utility 
industry to reflect the expertise of each agency.64  Similarly, scholars have 
                                                 
58
 See http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/default.htm, http://www.fda.gov/Cosmetics/default.htm; 
http://www.fda.gov/Food/default.htm (FDA authorities);  
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/About_FSIS/index.asp (FSIC authorities). 
59
 Compare http://www.cpsc.gov/about/about.html (describing CPSC jurisdiction) with 
http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/(linking to EPA pesticide regulatory initiatives). 
60
 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No, 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
61
 Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Paradox of the Global and the Local in the Financial Crisis 
of 2008: Applying the Lessons of Caritas in Veritate to the Regulation of Consumer 
Credit in the United States and the European Union, 26 J.L. & RELIGION 173, 183-84 
(2010-2011). 
62
 Kenneth A. Bamberger, Privacy on the Books and on the Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 
247, 257 (2011). 
63
 For discussion of how different scientific disciplines affect the design and management 
of natural resource regulatory systems, see Eric Biber, Which Science? Whose Science? 
How Scientific Disciplines Can Shape Environmental Law, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 471 (2012).  
64
 See Timothy P. Duane, Greening the Grid: Implementing Climate Change Policy 
Through Energy Efficiency, Renewable Portfolio Standards, and Strategic Transmission 
System Investments, 34 VT. L. REV. 711, 743-44 (2010). 
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urged expansion of the Copyright Office’s authority over complex and 
dynamic issues in which it has expertise.65   
B. Functional Jurisdiction 
Despite the relative inattention to it in the academic literature, the 
nature of a governmental entity’s functional authority is perhaps of equal 
importance to its substantive jurisdiction.  Governmental authority may be 
organized according to the particular regulatory activities or tasks in which 
the agency is authorized to engage.  Thus, although a statute may delegate 
to several agencies the authority to regulate a particular set of private 
activities, each agency may be in charge of a particular aspect of the 
regulatory program.  One agency, for example, may be responsible for 
collecting information needed to make regulatory decisions, while another 
may be charged with using that information to adopt regulatory standards 
that constrain private conduct.  The full array of agency functions include 
monitoring (whether ambient,66 compliance67 or effect and effectiveness 
monitoring 68 ); scientific research and data generation; information 
organization and distribution; funding; planning; standard setting; 
implementation and permitting; and enforcement.  
For many environmental agencies, functional jurisdiction is a 
subordinate form of regulatory division, such that the primary organizing 
principle for determining the bounds of an agency’s authority involves 
substantive authority, while the agency’s jurisdiction is secondarily based 
on function.  Typically, an agency is provided substantive authority over 
particular resources, issues, or problems, for which it creates offices or 
divisions that focus on sub-topics of that substantive authority.  For 
example, EPA includes Offices for Air and Radiation, Chemical Safety 
and Pollution Prevention, Solid Waste and Emergency Response, and 
Water, corresponding with its various substantive authorities to regulate 
air quality, pesticides and toxic substances, solid and hazardous waste, and 
                                                 
65
 See, e.g., Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 148 (2004).  But cf, 
Evan Stark, The Battered Mother in the Child Protective Service Caseload: Developing 
an Appropriate Response, 23 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 107, 130 (2002) (criticizing New 
York’s child protection laws on ground that “[d]omestic violence expertise within the 
agency is isolated and without substantive authority”). 
66
 See, e.g., Eric Biber, The Problem of Environmental Monitoring, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 
1 (2011) (detailing problems with ambient monitoring by resource agencies). 
67
 See, e.g., Availability of a Final Addendum to the Handbook for Habitat Conservation 
Planning and Incidental Take Permitting Process, 65 Fed. Reg. 35,252, 35,253 (June 1, 
2000) (defining compliance monitoring).   
68
 See, e.g., id. (defining effect and effectiveness monitoring to include whether he action 
or plan is achieving its stated goals and objectives).   
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water quality, respectively.69  These subdivisions often have authority over 
a range of functions, including monitoring, standard setting, and 
implementation/permitting, with authority further subdivided either by 
substantive subcategory and/or by functional activity.70   
However, agencies also often contain divisions or offices dedicated to 
particular regulatory functions, regardless of their substantive focus.  At 
EPA, these include the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, 
the Office of Environmental Information, the Office of General Counsel, 
the Office of Inspector General, the Office of International and Tribal 
Affairs, and the Office of Research and Development.71  These offices are 
charged with enforcement, information gathering, and research, 
respectively, across the entire range of EPA’s substantive authority.72  The 
Internal Revenue Service has separate offices to handle tax issues 
concerning small businesses and tax exempt organizations, a substantive 
division of authority, but it also reflects functional divisions, with separate 
offices for privacy and disclosure, whistleblowers, and criminal 
investigations, all of which cut across substantive lines. 73   Agencies 
routinely have separate offices to deal with congressional relations, media 
and communications, and legal matters, regardless of the substantive 
nature of the issue for which negotiations with the legislature, outreach of 
the media, or legal advice is required.74 
Such division of functional authority also occurs between agencies.  
The federal Clean Water Act, for example, creates shared substantive 
regulatory authority between EPA and the Corps of Engineers in 
controlling wetlands development.  The functions of the two agencies 
                                                 
69
 EPA ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/organization.html 
(last visited Feb. 6, 2013).  
70
 In 1993, EPA reorganized the Office of Compliance and Enforcement by centralizing 
in it enforcement authority previously dispersed among five offices.  U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency Office of Environmental Justice in the Matter of the Fifth Meeting of 
the Environmental Justice Advisory Council, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 623, 663 (1995).  
This shift illustrates that the structural relationships among offices within a single agency 
may differ along each of the three dimensions identified in this Article, just as 
relationships may differ among separate agencies. 
71
 EPA ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, supra note 69.  
72
 See Alfred E. Marcus, EPA’s Organizational Structure, 54-AUT. L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 5, 23 (1991). 
73
 See http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/irs_org_chart_2012_.pdf (organizational chart of 
the IRS). 
74
 See, e.g., United States Department of Agriculture,  USDA Agencies and Offices, 
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?navid=AGENCIES_OFFICES_C  
(describing offices within the Department of Agriculture, including the Office of 
Communications, the Office of Congressional Relations, and the Office of the General 
Counsel). 
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largely differ, however.  EPA and the Corps are jointly responsible for 
issuing guidelines for the issuance of dredge and fill permits that allow for 
the filling of wetlands,75  but the Corps is vested with the power to issue 
permits, subject to only limited EPA override.76   Similarly, under the 
Clean Air Act, EPA is charged with developing national ambient air 
quality standards to protect the public health and welfare,77 but the states 
are primarily responsible for devising plans to implement and achieve 
those standards.78 
Furthermore, though most regulatory authority is delegated firstly 
based on substantive scope, with functional jurisdiction usually a 
secondary organizing criterion, some agencies are organized with function 
as the principal basis for their authority.  For instance, Congress has 
delegated to the United States Government Accountability Office 
responsibility for audit, investigation, reporting, and evaluation of the 
federal agencies, regardless of the substantive area of regulation. 79  
Similarly, the White House Council on Environmental Quality has been 
granted responsibility to oversee implementation by all federal agencies of 
environmental impact assessment under the National Environmental 
Policy Act,80 including promulgation of guidelines and dispute resolution 
when there is interagency conflict.81  The United States Geological Survey 
is a research-only agency that generates biological, geographical, 
geological, and hydrological information that helps inform policy by 
regulatory authorities, but has no regulatory functions of its own.82  More 
broadly, of course, the separation of legislative, executive, and 
adjudicative power among the branches of government is a form of 
functional jurisdiction.  In this regard, William Buzbee has noted that a 
type of regulatory fragmentation, “institutional fragmentation,” is the 
result of an allocation of authority to “diverse institutions such as 
legislatures, agencies, courts and legally empowered citizens.”83  As more 
fully explored in Part IV, one of the principal aims of this Article is to 
encourage policymakers and scholars to focus more attention on whether 
                                                 
75
 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b) (2006). 
76
 Id. § 1344(a). 
77
 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (2006). 
78
 Id. § 7410(a).  EPA may adopt a plan if a state fails to submit an acceptable plan in 
limited circumstances.  Id. § 7410(c). 
79
 http://www.gao.gov/about/index.html.  
80
 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4375 (2006). 
81
 The Council on Environmental Quality – About, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ceq/about (“CEQ . . . acts as a referee 
when agencies disagree over the adequacy of such assessments.”). 
82
 United States Geological Survey, About USGS, http://www.usgs.gov/aboutusgs/.  
83
 William W. Buzbee, The Regulatory Fragmentation Continuum, Westway and the 
Challenges of Regional Growth, 21 J.L. & POL. 323, 348 (2005).   
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evaluating and allocating agency authority along functional rather than 
substantive lines holds greater promise of achieving the policy goals of a 
particular government program at least cost to competing policy goals. 
III. A TAXONOMY OF ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY 
This Part sets forth various key dimensions for analyzing the allocation 
of authority for addressing regulatory problems.  For any substantive area 
of regulation and governmental function, regulatory authority can be 
further evaluated along three key dimensions.  As illustrated in Figure 2, 
these include how centralized the authority is; how much overlap in 
governmental authority there is among multiple government bodies with 
concurrent jurisdiction over a particular regulatory problem; and the extent 
to which such authority is exercised independently or in coordination with 
other governmental entities with authority over a particular substantive 
area or function.   
Figure 2.  Dimension Relationships  
 
 
As explained in Part IV, some of these dimensions have been ignored 
or conflated in the diverse and substantial federalism and governance 
literature.  Yet each measures a particular component of regulatory 
authority, representing a different set of policies and ultimately values 
tradeoffs over the appropriate design for managing social problems.  
Accordingly, changes in the allocation of authority to address a regulatory 
problem may be appropriate along one dimension, but not others. 
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A. Decentralized versus Centralized Authority 
At least in the legal academic literature, perhaps the most frequently 
analyzed dimension for characterizing the allocation of regulatory 
authority focuses on the scale or level of government which is granted 
jurisdiction.  As illustrated in Figure 3 below, governmental authority 
could be allocated anywhere in a range between more or less centralized.  
On one extreme, a regime may be preemptively federal (e.g., the 
regulation of immigration,84 space exploration,85  or nuclear production86 
or waste).87  On the other end of the spectrum are regimes where authority 
is primarily local, such as land use zoning or the administration of water 
rights.  In between, there is a vast range of hybrids of federal, state, and 
local authority.  Some regimes involve various federal agencies;88 others 
consist of a federal regulator and single state regulator whose standards 
other states can opt to follow;89 still others a combination of both federal 
and state agencies.90 
Accordingly, one key question for this dimension is whether authority 
over resources is primarily decentralized to a local or state jurisdiction or 
more centralized at the federal level.  Another question, however, is 
whether regulatory authority within a certain level is delegated to one 
entity or divided among two or more entities.  Thus, if a statute allows 
only federal agencies to address a problem (preempting supplemental state 
or local regulation), the regime is centralized compared to one in which 
                                                 
84
 But cf. Arizona v. U.S., 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (refusing to enjoin implementation of 
state law requiring police to determine the immigration status of persons they stop, detain, 
or arrest on some other legitimate basis if “reasonable suspicion exists that the person is” 
an unlawful alien). 
85
 Cf. Van C. Ernest, Note, Third Party Liability of the Private Space Industry: to Pay 
What No One Has Paid Before, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 503, 533 (1991) (referring to 
“extensive federal regulation of space exploration”). 
86
 See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 
U.S. 190 (1983) (addressing impact of exclusive federal authority to regulate design and 
operation of nuclear power plants for health and safety, but not economic purposes). 
87
 Id. at 218 (discussing Department of Energy’s control over nuclear waste disposal). 
88
 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006) (requiring consultation among federal agencies 
on impacts of proposed activities on endangered species); 42 U.S.C. § 7475(d) (2006) 
(establishing role for federal land management agencies in EPA review of state 
disposition of permit applications for construction of sources whose emissions might 
affect federal lands such as national parks). 
89
 An example is automobile tailpipe emission regulation under the Clean Air Act, which 
grants EPA exclusive standard-setting authority, but allows California regulators to set 
alternative standards that, if approved by EPA, other state agencies can follow.  42 U.S.C. 
§§ 7507, 7543 (2006). 
90
 For example, stationary source regulation under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7402 
(2006), or public land management.  See 1 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 57, at § 
1:1. 
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regulators in all fifty states were allowed to regulate.  Within the federal 
government, regulatory authority could be fully centralized in one agency 
or decentralized by dividing authority among multiple federal agencies.91  
We regard the degree of fragmentation of authority among multiple 
regulators as a second aspect of characterizing a regulatory regime as 
centralized or decentralized.92    
Figure 3.  Centralized versus Decentralized Authority 
 
                                                 
91
 An example may best illustrate the point.  With some exceptions, the authority to 
regulate federally owned lands is the sole prerogative of the federal government, so that 
the authority is centralized.  In those substantive areas in which states retain concurrent 
jurisdiction, such as wildlife management, authority is more decentralized.  See 3 
COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 57, § 32:8.  If Congress had vested federal land 
management authority in a single federal agency, authority would have been centralized 
still further.  Instead, jurisdiction to manage different kinds of federal lands systems (e.g., 
national parks, national forests, wildlife refuges, and other public lands) has been 
delegated to (and decentralized among) a group of agencies, including the National Park 
Service, the National Forest Service, the FWS, and the Bureau of Land Management. 
92
 Similarly, even if authority is delegated exclusively to one agency, federal or state, that 
agency may contain multiple offices, divisions, or bureaus.  If so, authority is 
decentralized within the agency, and authority among the components within the agency 
can be overlapping or distinct, and coordinated or independent.  For purposes of this 
Article, when we refer to a fully centralized agency, we mean an agency that has no 
internal subdivisions.  We recognize, however, that subdivisions within an agency may 
be aligned at different points along the overlap and coordination dimensions, just as 
multiple agencies may be so aligned. 
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1. Decentralized Authority 
For centuries, at least as far back as the origination of the concept of 
subsidiarity, 93  scholars have promoted the idea that authority is best 
allocated at the local level. 94   A popular rationale for decentralized 
regulation is its ability to leverage local knowledge and expertise,95 while 
a related, second justification might be to ensure regulation is better 
tailored to local conditions, preferences, and economic conditions.96  We 
refer to these justifications respectively as the expertise and diversity 
rationales for decentralized regulation.  Third, many argue that 
decentralized government of this first kind allows opportunities for 
regulatory experimentation that can encourage innovation.97  These three 
justifications for localizing regulation are primarily (although not 
exclusively) based on the pursuit of more effective regulation.98   
A related and commonly purported benefit of decentralized 
governance is that interlocal competition maximizes social utility by 
                                                 
93
 Subsidiarity is the organizing principle “that a central authority should have a 
subsidiary function, performing only those tasks which cannot be performed effectively 
at a more immediate or local level.”  Oxford English Dictionary, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/193007?redirectedFrom=subsidiarity#eid.  It is a general 
principle of European Union law.  See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European 
Union, Article 5(3). 
94
 See Jeffrey S. Dornbos, All (Water) Politics Is Local: A Proposal for Resolving 
Transboundary Water Disputes, 22 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 17 (2010) (“[T]he 
Constitution's structure of reserving non-enumerated powers to the states ‘suggests a 
principle of ‘subsidiarity’”) (citation omitted). 
95
 See, e.g., Dornbos, supra note 94, at 17.  Professor Vermeule distinguishes between 
“local” and “global” knowledge, with proponents of decentralized authority tending to 
prefer context-specific knowledge about economic or regulatory programs, while 
advocates of centralized programs tend to focus on the benefits of a broader “:synoptic” 
approach to regulation.  Adrian Vermeule, Local and Global Knowledge in the 
Administrative State, at 2, 18, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2169939.  Much as we do in this 
article with respect to the three dimensions we address, Professor Vermeule recognizes 
that the distinction between contextual and synoptic knowledge is “highly stylistic, 
whereas in reality there is a continuum between the two extremes and everything is a 
matter of degree.”  Id. 
96
 See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 130, 136-37 (2005). 
97
 See, e.g., Dornbos, supra note 94, at 17 (noting that states may “act as ‘laboratories’ for 
innovative solutions”); David L. Markell, States as Innovators: It's Time for a New Look 
to Our “Laboratories of Democracy” in the Effort to Improve Our Approach to 
Environmental Regulation, 58 ALB. L. REV. 347, 355 (1994) (describing capacity of state 
and local governments to act as “innovation centers” for environmental regulation by 
providing “the opportunity to try a wide variety of approaches simultaneously or within 
short periods of time”); Adler, supra note 96, at 137. 
98
 Though primarily based on promoting effective regulation, the diversity justification 
for decentralization—allowing regulation more closely tailored to local conditions and 
circumstances—can also be justified on equity grounds. 
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allowing each local community to shape its interests and goals.99   As 
indicated below, however, though some level of decentralization may be a 
necessary condition for competition to occur, we think that competition of 
this kind flows more precisely from what we define as independently 
structured government authority than from decentralization.100   Finally, 
some also argue that localized allocation of authority makes decision-
makers more accessible and therefore promotes more accountable and 
democratic governance.101  A related claim postulates that local regulators 
tend to be more accountable than regulators at higher government levels. 
Relying on these various justifications, before 1960 state and local 
laws were the only significant governmental constraints on pollution in the 
United States, with a few exceptions.102  These included state common law 
causes of action such as nuisance, trespass, negligence, and strict liability, 
as well as local land use regulations designed to segregate industrial from 
residential uses, thereby minimizing opportunities for pollution produced 
by the former to harm the latter.103  Other examples of traditional state and 
local regulation that the Supreme Court has identified include matters of 
health care and protection of public safety, 104  such as regulation of 
vaccines,105 advertising,106 family and probate law,107  employee welfare 
                                                 
99
 See generally Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures. 64 J. POL. ECON. 
416 (1956) (promoting decentralization model premised on interlocal competition for 
consumer-voters); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974) (same).  
According to one source, “[u]nder competitive federalism, state and federal governments 
compete with one another to provide regulation to a mobile citizenry.”  Bruce Johnsen, 
The Evolution of Sherman Act Jurisdiction: A Roadmap for Competitive Federalism, 7 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 403, 405 (2004).  
100
 See infra Part III.C.2. 
101
 See, e.g., GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT 
BUILDING WALLS (PRINCETON U. PRESS 1999). 
102
 The River and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 407, prohibited the discharge of 
“refuse matter” without a federal permit, but the program’s principal objective was to 
promote commerce by preserving navigability.  Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative 
to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 729 (2006) [hereinafter Glicksman, Mutation]. 
103
 Local governments also enacted smoke control ordinances and laws. Glicksman, 
Mutation, supra note 102, at 729-30. 
104
 Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 334 (2008). Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. 
Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 387 (2002); Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 237 (2000). 
105
 Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1096 n.15 (2011). 
106
 Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77 (2008); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly 
533 U.S. 525, 541 (2001). 
107
 Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 151 (2001). 
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benefit plans,108 protection of the security of real estate titles,109 insurance 
contracts,110 education, and enforcement of criminal laws.111 
It is important to note that though decentralized authority is most 
likely to be associated with local or state regulatory control, federal 
regulatory authority could be modified to be more or less decentralized  
(or fragmented) as well.  Some of the same justifications for local or state 
regulatory authority may be similarly levied for delegating jurisdiction 
over particular substantive areas or regulatory functions to a variety of 
disparate federal agencies.  Particularized expertise 112  and regulatory 
experimentation to promote innovation113 may lead to the allocation of 
federal authority away from a heavily consolidated model toward one with 
more decentralized federal jurisdiction.  These expertise and 
experimentation rationales tout the effectiveness advantages of 
decentralized regulation.  The diversity and accountability rationales for 
decentralizing regulation to state or local authorities, however, would not 
support this second aspect of decentralization.  
2. Centralized Authority 
Despite the diversity, experimentation, democratic, and expertise 
critiques of centralized government, 114  many legislatures and scholars 
have increasingly accepted that at least for some regulatory problems, 
centralization makes sense.  Centralization can take advantage of 
                                                 
108
 California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Const., N.A., Inc., 519 
U.S. 316, 330 (1997); New York State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. 
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655-56 (1995). 
109
 BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 544 (1994). 
110
 Metrop. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 740 (1985). 
111
 U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
112
 See, e.g., Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1142 (noting that dispersal of authority 
can “harness the unique expertise and competencies of different agencies,” and that these 
benefits may justify resulting policy inconsistencies and wasteful redundancy).   
113
 See Alejandro E. Camacho, Transforming the Means and Ends of Natural Resources 
Management, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1405, 1423 (2011) (noting how decentralized governance 
can promote “regulatory experimentation to reduce uncertainty”). 
114
 See e.g., Liesbet Hooghe & Gary Marks, Unraveling the Central State, But How?, 
POLITICAL SCIENCE SERIES, INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES, VIENNA 6 (2003); 
available at: http://aei.pitt.edu/530/2/pw_87.pdf (“Centralized government is not well 
suited to accommodate diversity.  Ecological conditions may vary from area to area. . . .  
Preferences of citizens may also vary sharply across regions within a state, and if one 
takes such heterogeneity into account, the optimal level of authority may be lower than 
economies of scale dictate.”); Dornbos, supra note 94, at 17 (“[O]ver-centralized 
approaches to environmental regulation are inflexible and do not adequately account for 
local environmental conditions.”); ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM 259, 263 (Terry L. 
Anderson & Peter J. Hill eds., 1997) (arguing that a centralized approach to 
environmental justice issues would be unresponsive to local conditions and needs). 
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economies of scale that are forfeited if regulatory authority is dispersed.115  
Some have argued, for example, that certain government functions, such 
as research or standard setting, should be centralized at the federal level 
because of the economies of scale of a single authority administering the 
function.116  This is obviously an argument premised on the comparatively 
greater administrative efficiency of centralized regulation. 
In addition, authority may be best centrally allocated at the federal 
level because of the national character of the issues involved or because of 
collective action concerns.  Some regulatory matters have national 
footprints that are best addressed by a federal authority.  These might 
include immigration policy,117 pension plan administration,118 protection 
of intellectual property rights,119 protection of union-related advocacy,120 
or control of activities on the high seas,121 such as maritime commerce.122  
In environmental law and other contexts, some harms may cross 
jurisdictional lines, necessitating more centralized regulatory control to 
prevent or manage interstate spillovers.123  Trade wars among the states124 
and state product labeling requirements 125  have been characterized as 
other kinds of activity that generates interstate spillovers that justify 
centralized federal regulation.  Similarly, state public utility regulators 
have adopted policies designed to benefit in-state interests at the expense 
of outsiders.126  In addition, states can export economic burdens to other 
                                                 
115
 O’Connell, supra note 1, at 1680. 
116
 See, e.g., Esty, Environmental Federalism, supra note 6, at, 614; Daniel C. Esty, 
Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1495, 1562 (1999) 
(discussing value of economies of scale through consolidation of scientific or analytic 
work needed for environmental regulation); Adler, supra note 96, at 148. 
117
 See J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of 
Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL. L. 363, 423 (2009). 
118
 See Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 838-39 (1997). 
119
 See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 162 (1989); Sears, 
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225. 231 (1964). 
120
 See Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Brown, 554 U.S. 60, 76 (2008). 
121
 See Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 233 (1986). 
122
 See U.S. v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 103 (2000);  Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 
U.S. 668, 674-75 (1982). 
123
 Adler, supra note 96, at 139; ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, THE ECONOMY, AND 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 11 (Richard L. Revesz et al. eds., 2000); Daniel A. Farber, 
Climate Adaptation and Federalism: Mapping the Issues, 1 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & 
ENERGY L. 259, 266 (2009). 
124
 See Johnsen, supra note 99, at 449. 
125
 See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Regulation, Deregulation, Federalism, and Administrative 
Law: Agency Power to Preempt State Regulation, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 607, 666 (1985). 
126
 See Amy L. Stein, The Tipping Point of Federalism, 45 CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2012) [MS at 37]. 
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jurisdictions if they regulate the sale of products that produce local harms 
but that are manufactured (and produce employment and economic 
benefits) in other states. 127   In these contexts, centralized regulatory 
structures may be more effective than decentralized regulation.128  Finally, 
James Madison and others have argued that centralized regulation has 
comparative fairness advantages because of its ability to promote uniform 
treatment of similarly situated entities regardless of location, and to 
temper the ability of self-interested factions to control the levers of power 
to the disadvantage of less powerful groups or interests. 129   Thus, 
centralization may promote equity among those affected by government 
programs by treating similarly situated entities alike. 
In addition, much of American federal environmental law is premised 
on averting a “race to the bottom” from decentralized governance, in 
which local jurisdictions compete with each other by progressively 
lowering environmental standards. 130   Under this dynamic, individual 
states have incentives to lower standards to compete for industry whether 
or not other states do the same, even though the states as a collective 
would be better off not doing so.131  Congress invoked the undesirable 
specter of a race to the bottom when, in 1977, it amended the Clean Air 
Act.  A House report warned that “[i]f there is no Federal policy, States 
may find themselves forced into a bidding war to attract new industry by 
reducing pollution standards.”132  Similarly, the Supreme Court, in Hodel 
v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association,133 characterized 
the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act,134 also adopted in 1977, 
                                                 
127
 See Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on 
Ceiling Preemption by Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate 
Change, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 579, 599-600 (2008). 
128
 See Stewart, supra note 6 at 1215 (discussing how interstate “spillover[s] ... generate 
conflicts and welfare losses not easily remedied under a decentralized regime”). 
129
 See, e.g., JAMES MADISON, FEDERALIST NO. 10 56 (defining faction as citizens “united 
and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of 
other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community”); 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, THE ECONOMY, AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 
123, at 11 (“[E]nvironmental interests are often underrepresented at the local level and 
centralized regulation may . . . ensur[e] that a broad spectrum of interests is represented”). 
130
 Kirsten Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It “to 
the Bottom”? 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997);  Peter D. Swire, The Race of Laxity and the 
Race to Undesirability: Explaining Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in 
Environmental Law, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 67 (1996). 
131
 If other states do not lower standards, an individual state is in a better position to 
attract industry, while if other states lower standards, then the state must act in a similar 
manner to compete effectively. 
132
 H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 152 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1231. 
133
 452 U.S. 264 (1981).  
134
 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1328 (2006). 
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as a response “to a congressional finding that nationwide ‘surface mining 
and reclamation standards are essential in order to insure that competition 
in interstate commerce among sellers of coal produced in different States 
will not be used to undermine the ability of the several States to improve 
and maintain adequate standards on coal mining operations within their 
borders.’” 135   Such a dynamic has been noted in other substantive 
jurisdictions as well.136  
In some instances, Congress has chosen to centralize authority for only 
a particular governmental function, or to centralize authority incrementally 
over time on a function-by-function basis, as it did in adopting air and 
water pollution control laws.  Beginning in the 1950s, the federal 
government enhanced its responsibility for performing certain functions in 
halting air and water pollution before others.  At first, Congress imposed 
greater centralization of information-gathering and dissemination through 
passage of laws that funded research into the causes and effects of 
pollution. 137   These laws reflected the judgment that the states and 
localities lacked the resources to engage in or fund the research needed to 
support the adoption of effective pollution control laws.138  Armed with 
the information that federally assisted research could provide, the states 
and localities were presumed to be able to attack pollution and avoid 
public health effects more effectively.  In the 1960s, Congress chose to 
provide technical and financial assistance to the states, such as by 
subsidizing the construction of municipal sewage treatment works. 139 
Before long, the federal government increased its role in standard-setting 
in a limited range of situations in which state and local control of interstate 
                                                 
135
 Hodel, 452 U.S. at 281–82 (quoting 30 U.S.C. § 1201(g)). 
136
 See, e.g., Cary, supra note 6, at 666 (identifying value of centralized regulation for 
preventing a race to the bottom in shareholder rights against corporations); Lynn LoPucki 
& Sara Kalin, The Failure of Public Company Bankruptcies in Delaware and New York: 
Empirical Evidence of a “Race to the Bottom”, 54 VAND. L. REV. 231, 266 (2000) 
(bankruptcy law); Laurence H. Tribe, The Constitutionality of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act: Swimming in the Stream of Commerce, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
873, 880 (2012) (health care for the uninsured); Dan T. Coenen, Originalism and the 
“Individual Mandate”: Rounding out the Government's Case for Constitutionality, 107 
NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 55, 71 (2012) (same); Timothy P. Glynn, Interjurisdictional 
Competition in Enforcing Noncompetition Agreements: Regulatory Risk Management 
and the Race to the Bottom, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1381 (2008); Christopher Paul, 
Note, Innovation or a Race to the Bottom? Trust “Modernization” in New Hampshire, 7 
PIERCE L. REV. 353, 372 (2009) (discretionary asset protection trusts).  
137
 See, e.g., An Act to Improve, Strengthen, and Accelerate Programs for the Prevention 
and Abatement of Air Pollution, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963). 
138
 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 89-2170, at 4 (1966), as reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3473, 
3476; Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1961, H.R. REP. NO. 87-306, 
at 5 (1961), as reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2076, 2079 (“The need for a much greater 
Federal research effort was consistently recognized during the hearings on the bill.”). 
139
 Glicksman, Mutation, supra note 102, at 730. 
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pollution was ineffective.140  Congress subsequently gave EPA and other 
federal agencies broad standard-setting authority over a range of 
environmental media, including air, water, hazardous and solid waste, 
pesticides, and other toxic substances.141  
B. Overlapping versus Distinct Authority 
Another important dimension takes the form of a spectrum ranging 
from overlapping to distinct regulatory authority.  As represented in 
Figure 4 below, on one extreme, governmental authority over a particular 
substantive issue or governmental function may be separate from any 
other governmental authority.  For the purposes of our analysis, two 
governmental entities have overlapping jurisdiction only if (and to the 
extent) that both their substantive and functional authority intersect and 
affect each other.142  We do not treat agencies which share authority to 
regulate a particular subject matter but which perform wholly separate 
functions within that area as agencies with overlapping authority.  
Geographically distinct authority provides a straightforward illustration of 
agencies with different ranges of substantive authority.  For example, each 
state has sovereign public trust and police powers (including the authority 
to manage its public lands and regulate land use) within its particular 
geographic boundaries that are largely discrete and exclusive from the 
authority of other states to do likewise. 143   Similarly, in federal land 
management, the USFS manages designated forests, NPS manages 
designated parks, and the BLM manages designated public lands, and in 
general each agency has little authority over how the others do so.144   
On the other end of the spectrum are regimes in which there are many 
governmental institutions with considerable intersecting authority.  For 
instance, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), NPS, NFS, FWS, 
and state wildlife and land agencies share authority over the management 
of wildlife. 145   CEQ is granted some authority under the National 
Environmental Policy Act over information and planning, FWS engages in 
                                                 
140
 See, e.g., Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1956, H.R. REP. NO. 84-1446, 
at 2 (1955), as reprinted in 1955 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3023, 3024. 
141
 See LAZARUS, supra note 5, at 70-73. 
142
 Accordingly, the authority of a municipality in Australia to regulate land use is 
effectively distinct from the authority of a municipality in Maine to do the same, even 
though both regulate land use.  
143
 See, e.g., Carolina Trucks & Equipment, Inc. v. Volvo Trucks of N. Am., Inc., 492 
F.3d 484, 491-92 (4th Cir. 2007) (discussing constraints on extraterritorial application of 
the police power). 
144
 See 1 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 57, §§ 2:11-2:14, 6:14-6:18 (discussing the 
various federal lands systems and the jurisdictions of the agencies that manage them). 
145
 See 3 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 57, §§ 32:6-32:17 (discussing jurisdiction 
of federal and state agencies over wildlife on federal lands). 
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planning and standard setting over endangered species pursuant to the 
Endangered Species Act, while federal and state land management 
agencies have planning, implementation and enforcement authority.146 
Figure 4.  Prototypical Examples of Distinct and Overlapping Authority 
 
Accordingly, although more than one agency may share substantive 
authority (e.g., more than one agency has the authority to control wetlands 
development), we do not treat that authority as overlapping unless the 
agencies perform the same governmental function within that area (e.g., 
shared enforcement authority between federal and state regulators for state 
requirements adopted under delegated federal authority).  If regulatory 
power is fully centralized in one regulator, this dimension does not come 
into play.  If, however, policymakers decide to divide authority among 
more than one entity, this dimension implicates two key questions.  The 
first is whether authority over a particular resource or regulatory problem 
(e.g., water pollution) should be divided up so that, even though there are 
multiple regulators, each is responsible for addressing a distinct 
component of the larger problem (e.g., one controls point source and 
another controls nonpoint source pollution, or one controls pollution by 
non-nuclear materials while another has sole authority over nuclear 
materials).147  The second is whether regulatory functions should overlap 
(e.g., if one agency is authorized to review and, if appropriate, veto, the 
                                                 
146
 See generally 2 & 3 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 57, ch. 17, 29, 32. 
147
 See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863, 864 (2006) 
(discussing jurisdictional overlap, in which agencies have “regulatory authority over the 
same individuals or institutions, with regard to the same or related issues”). 
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issuance of permits by another) or instead comprise distinct mandates 
(e.g., if one agency sets standards, while another applies those standards in 
the context of resolving individual permit applications).148 
1. Distinct Authority 
Legislatures have long adopted and scholars have promoted the idea 
that authority over a particular regulatory problem is best allocated to a 
single or few regulators.  Such a perspective is primarily based on an 
explicit or implicit “matching principle”— that legislatures should match 
each regulatory problem (or aspect of a regulatory problem) to the single 
authority that can best address that problem.149  Advocates of the matching 
principle urge, for example, that environmental regulatory authority 
generally should be vested in “the political jurisdiction that comes closest 
to matching the geographic area affected by a particular externality.”150 
In addition, scholars have identified various weaknesses of a 
regulatory system with overlapping regulatory authority.  Some criticize 
overlapping governance because regulator accountability to the public 
may be diminished in a regulatory system where authority intersects.151  
Agencies with shared authority may shirk their responsibilities, blaming 
co-regulators for program failures.152  The resulting inaction may unfairly 
impose risks or costs on those affected by the unregulated activity.  
Similar risks and costs may not occur in jurisdictions in which at least one 
regulator with shared authority is more diligent or conscientious in the 
exercise of that authority.  Others have posited that overlapping 
jurisdiction can lead to a lack of finality in the regulatory process.153 
One of the more common criticisms of overlapping jurisdiction is that 
it is wasteful and inefficient, both for regulators and regulated entities.    
The government’s “transaction costs” of regulating increase if multiple 
                                                 
148
 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b), 1342(b) (2006) (delegating standard-setting function 
to EPA and permitting function to states meeting certain minimum requirements). 
149
 See HENRY N. BUTLER & JONATHAN R. MACEY, USING FEDERALISM TO IMPROVE 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1996). 
150
 Id. at 48. See also Adler, supra note 96, at 133. 
151
 Robert Schapiro, From Dualist Federalism to Interactive Federalism, 56 EMORY L.J. 
1, 17 (2006); Robert A. Schapiro, Monophonic Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 811, 
812-13 (2008); Engel, supra note 7, at 162.   
152
 Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1187; Todd S. Aagaard, Regulatory Overlap, 
Overlapping Legal Fields, and Statutory Discontinuities, 29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 241, 288 
(2011) (“Regulatory overlap thus may lead each regulator to shirk . . . within an area of 
overlapping jurisdiction.”).   
153
 Engel, supra note 7, at 162. 
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agencies perform tasks that could have been handled by a single agency.154  
Efforts to coordinate among multiple regulators can address redundancy, 
but can themselves be costly.155  Consolidation of authority therefore may 
make sense within a governmental level.  As the proposed reorganization 
of the six agencies with jurisdiction over small businesses discussed in the 
introduction to this Article illustrates, such consolidation is often seen as a 
way to minimize redundancy and duplication of effort, thereby promoting 
administrative efficiency.156 
For regulated entities, multiple bodies of regulation require tracking 
and complying with disparate and potentially conflicting sets of 
obligations.157  Overlapping regulation also can reduce certainty and thus 
effectiveness if the relationships among the mandates of different 
regulators are unclear.158  Some suggest it be fundamentally unfair if an 
entity is regulated by multiple government bodies and potentially subject 
to various different standards. 159   Some also claim that overlapping 
authority can lead to over-regulation where “numerous regulators are 
confronted with a more particularized project or proposal with localized 
and discernible effects.”160  These scholars consider overlapping authority 
ineffective “because it may result in the development of inefficient 
standards, both through the introduction of regulatory goals other than 
externality elimination, and through interference with the free movement 
of firms through government over-appropriation of fixed capital assets.”161    
Others, however, have asserted that overlapping jurisdiction can lead 
to under-regulation, an unintended result of what Professor William 
                                                 
154
 Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1150.  Freeman and Rossi cite as an example the 
shared responsibility of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission in 
enforcing the federal antitrust laws.  Id. at 1146.  See also Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping 
and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 214 
(discussing duplicative monitoring and enforcement costs). 
155
 Aagaard, supra note 152, at 288; Vermeule, supra note 95, at 24 (discussing increased 
costs of communication among agencies that accompany the creation of dense networks 
of related agencies). 
156
 William W. Buzbee, State GHG Regulation, Federal Climate Change Legislation, and 
the Preemption Sword, 1 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE CHANGE & ENERGY L. 23, 53 (2009) 
(referring to “additional cops on the beat” ). 
157
 Marisam, supra note 20, at 223 (referring to “the burdens on regulated entities that 
must comply with two agencies’ regulations”); Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1150. 
158
 See Ahdieh, supra note 147, at 897. 
159
 Cf. Laura E. Little, Empowerment through Restraint: Reverse Preemption or Hybrid 
Lawmaking?, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 955, 984 (2009) (referring to the “problems of 
legal instability and unfairness resulting from multiple regulations on one wrong”). 
160
 See Buzbee, supra note 83, at 349.  See also James M. Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon, 
Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons, 43 J.L. & ECON. 1, 11–12 (2000). 
161
 Engel, supra note 7, at 165-66.  
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Buzbee has dubbed the creation of a “regulatory commons,”162 especially 
when the regulated problem or harm is large-scale and broadly 
dispersed. 163   Buzbee attributes this to high information costs of 
developing a regulatory response, limited credit for regulators, bias toward 
the regulatory status quo, and regulator risk aversion.164  The result may be 
that although multiple regulators have authority to address a particular 
problem, regulatory gaps develop as each assumes or hopes that others are 
addressing it.165  Buzbee suggests that reducing the number of potential 
regulators and/or combining the regulatory authority of particular 
regulators could lessen the incentives for regulatory inaction in some 
contexts. 166   Thus, some argue that distinct regulation may be more 
effective than overlapping regulation.   
Other collective action problems may support distinct regulation.  
Congress adopted exclusive federal jurisdiction over standard-setting for 
nuclear waste disposal facilities, transportation of hazardous waste, 
transportation and disposal of other forms of nuclear material, and 
management of biomedical waste based on concerns that state and local 
governments would adopt constraints on locally unwanted activities with 
broader, more diffuse social benefits.167  For example, Congress passed 
the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980168 to distribute the 
environmental burdens of the disposal of nuclear waste more equitably.169   
Though obviously related, at least in some cases the centralization and 
overlap dimensions do not necessarily present the same choices to 
policymakers, and moves along the two dimensions may have different 
effects on regulatory authority.  Typically, a centralization of substantive 
regulatory power results in a decrease in overlap.  Federal deregulation 
that provides for unitary state regulation would decrease overlap in 
authority, just as federal ceiling preemption of state law (under which state 
                                                 
162
 Buzbee, supra note 7, at 5–6. 
163
 See Buzbee, supra note 83, at 348 (noting incentives of multiple potential regulators 
for regulatory inattention, especially for cross-jurisdictional problems). 
164
 Buzbee, supra note 182, at 30–36.   
165
 Ahdieh, supra note 147, at 897-98 (noting the costs of intersystemic regulation, 
including shirking, diminished oversight, free-riding, loss of incentives to regulate 
carefully, and tendency to blame co-regulators). 
166
 See Buzbee, supra note 7, at 51. 
167
 See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 5125 (preempting some state regulation of hazardous waste 
packaging and transportation); Tennessee v. United States Dep’t of Transp., 326 F.3d 729, 
730–31 (6th Cir. 2003) (describing federal hazardous materials transportation legislation 
as “an effort to create a coherent approach to . . . problems posed by the interstate 
transportation of hazardous material”). 
168
 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b–2021d (2000). 
169
 See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 127, at 600-01. 
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governments are barred from regulating more stringently than the federal 
government)170 would.  For example, in addition to being a shift toward 
centralization, the creation of certain federal authority over automobile 
tailpipe emission standards, 171  pesticides, 172  and nuclear waste 173 
represented movements away from overlap by preempting supplemental 
state standards, even if they were more stringent than the federal 
standards.   
On the other hand, a federal law establishing a new federal agency 
with only floor preemption authority — under which state authorities may 
adopt more stringent regulation than their federal counterpart — would 
result in an increase in centralization as well as overlap.174  Moreover, 
decreases or increases in overlap may occur not only over substantive 
jurisdiction but also over particular regulatory functions.  For example, 
increasing limitations on or barring the authority of federal agencies to 
overfile — to commence enforcement action against permit holders in 
addition to state agency enforcement 175  — would decrease overlap in 
enforcement functions.176 
2. Overlapping Authority 
Overlapping authority has its proponents.  A large and growing 
literature identifies a variety of effectiveness and accountability benefits 
associated with a regulatory system with concurrent regulatory authority.  
                                                 
170
 See William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the 
Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1551 (2007) (discussing arguments 
for and against ceiling or “unitary federal choice” preemption that “eliminates 
institutional diversity.”) 
171
  See 42 U.S.C. § 7543 (2006) (generally prohibiting the adoption or enforcement of 
state tailpipe emission standards, but allowing EPA to waive prohibition by granting a 
waiver to California). 
172
 See 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2006) (preempting state regulation of labeling and packaging 
of pesticide products). 
173
 See supra note 167.  Congress adopted exclusive federal jurisdiction in this area based 
on concerns that state and local governments would adopt constraints on locally 
unwanted activities with broader, more diffuse social benefits. See 49 U.S.C. § 5125 
(2006). 
174
 Thus, many of the federal pollution statutes provide for floor preemption, retaining 
state authority to adopt regulations that are more stringent than their federal counterparts. 
See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2006). 
175
 See infra note 272 and accompanying text (discussing the advantages and 
disadvantages of overlapping enforcement authority). 
176
 Similarly, in adopting the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Congress chose to preempt all 
state regulation of the manner in which nuclear power plants operate, but to retain state 
authority to decide whether to bar issuance of operating permits based on economic 
reasons (such as the affordability of the energy produced by nuclear plants). Pacific Gas 
and Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983). 
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Some scholars have reasoned that an approach that minimizes overlap and 
consolidates decision making in a single or few authorities can have a 
number of negative consequences.  In addition to pointing to the 
implausibility of eliminating already extensive regulatory segmentation,177 
many scholars have detailed the undesirability of doing so.178  
Some scholars argue that the redundancy that occurs through 
overlapping jurisdiction can be advantageous.179  Though much of this 
literature relates to allocation of authority between the federal government 
and the states and localities,180 the same dynamic applies to overlap within 
a particular level of government.  To begin with, although overlap can 
create inefficiencies, as described above,181 it can enhance the prospects 
for effective regulation.  The key idea is that concurrent jurisdiction 
increases the likelihood of regulatory action because there are more actors 
with authority to regulate.182  Should one regulatory entity backslide or fail 
to regulate, others would be available to fill the gap. 183   Concurrent 
jurisdiction thus may be particularly valuable for regulatory contexts184 
where the costs of under-regulation are high, such as those that seek to 
address high-cost or irreversible effects or the management of 
                                                 
177
  Buzbee, supra note 7, at 51.  
178
  Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 7; Buzbee, supra note 7, at 51; Adelman & Engel, supra 
note 7, at 1800-01; Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State Constitutions in 
the Federal Courts, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1409, 1417 (1999).    
179
 Jared Snyder & Jonathan Binder, The Changing Climate of Cooperative Federalism: 
The Dynamic Role of the States in A National Strategy to Combat Climate Change, 27 
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 231, 252 (2009). 
180
 See, e.g., Blake Hudson, Reconstituting Land-Use Federalism to Address Transitory 
and Perpetual Disasters: The Bimodal Federalism Framework, 2011 B.Y.U. L REV. 
1991, 2037. 
181
 See supra notes 154 to 266 and accompanying text. 
182
 Buzbee, supra note 156, at 53. 
183
 See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1138 (arguing that redundancy provides 
insurance against a single agency’s failure); Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods 
and Pleas: Limited Government in an Era of Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350, 354 
(2011) (arguing that overlap “opens space” for each regulator “to prod and plea with one 
another when the danger . . . is one of government underreach”); Michael Doran, 
Legislative Organization and Administrative Redundancy, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1815, 1819 
(2011) (arguing that redundancy can “provid[e] an important failsafe”). 
184
 Professor Biber has argued that the desirable amount of overlap is likely to be highly 
contextual, depending on factors such as whether the agencies concerned have goals that 
are complementary or in tension with one other, the cultures and professional 
backgrounds of agencies and their personnel, and the political context.  See Biber, supra 
note 51. at 78. The location of the relevant agencies along the other dimensions identified 
in this article is also likely to be important, such as whether the agencies have cooperative 
or competitive relationships. 
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nonrenewable resources. 185   Relatedly, concurrent jurisdiction has the 
potential to improve decisions and enhance the effectiveness of 
government programs by allowing authorities with a range of different 
competencies to be brought to bear on a problem.186   
The regulatory safety net resulting from overlap also can foster 
accountability by indirectly combating interest group capture that may 
exist for one governmental entity but not another.187  As Anne Joseph 
O’Connell has noted, “[o]ne interest group generally will find it more 
difficult to capture several agencies than a single agency; to wield power 
over multiple agencies, interest groups may have to work together, which 
is a costly enterprise for the groups.” 188   In addition, agencies with 
overlapping subject matter and functional jurisdiction may be more 
reluctant to respond favorably to interest group pressure because other 
agencies sharing regulatory authority may detect and cast adverse light on 
that behavior.189 
Both distinct and overlapping authority, therefore, have the potential to 
enhance accountability, depending on the circumstances and incentives of 
regulators.  Distinct authority is better situated to promote accountability if 
the primary accountability problem is the tendency of co-regulators to 
shirk their responsibilities and to blame co-regulators for program 
failures.190  On the other hand, overlapping authority is better designed to 
promote accountability if one co-regulator’s likely response to another’s 
lack of regulation is not to assign blame, but instead to step into the 
regulatory breach, or if capture is a prominent concern.  Which account is 
more compelling to policymakers may depend on assessments of the 
history of the particular regulatory program and social problem in 
question, and policymakers’ philosophies about institutional incentives 
and behavior.191 
                                                 
185
 See Engel, supra note 7, at 179. See also Ewing & Kysar, supra note 183, at 410 
(“Overlapping governance mechanisms . . . ensure a fuller and more inclusive 
characterization of emerging threats to social and environmental well-being.”). 
186
 Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting Governance to Climate Change: Managing 
Uncertainty Through a Learning Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 1, 67-68 (2009). 
187
 See Engel, supra note 7, at 178-79 (noting that overlap can combat excessive 
influence of interest groups that prevents effective regulation). 
188
 O’Connell, supra note 1, at 1677.  Likewise, agencies with broader jurisdiction are 
harder to capture than agencies with narrower ones because “all of the covered industries 
must bid against one another to capture the regulator.”  Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 3, 
at 33. 
189
 Aagaard, supra note 152, at 294 (2011). 
190
 See supra notes 151 to 152 and accompanying text. 
191
 See infra note 210 and accompanying text.   
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Some also argue that overlapping authority may provide space for 
initial regulatory strategies by one entity that can serve as a proving 
ground.192  These commenters contend that a dispersed and overlapping 
regulatory system, such as the delegation of authority to the states 
allowing the adoption of pollution controls more stringent than federal 
standards,193 may allow for a diversity of tailored approaches, promoting 
innovative management experimentation and creating the opportunity for 
learning about the advantages and disadvantages of particular management 
strategies. 194   According to these scholars, concurrent authority can 
promote innovation by providing regulators close access to information 
about the efficacy of alternative management strategies based on their 
observations of the experience of co-regulators.195  As detailed in Part IV, 
however, these arguments touting the diversity benefits of overlapping 
jurisdiction appear to be erroneously conflating it with decentralized 
authority.196   
C. Independent versus Coordinated Authority 
A final dimension for characterizing the allocation of authority focuses 
on the extent of formal or informal coordination among authorities with 
jurisdiction over a particular regulatory problem or government function.  
For this dimension, the key question is how much multiple regulatory 
authorities communicate, coordinate, and collaborate in addressing any 
particular substantive problem or in performing a delegated governmental 
function. As illustrated in Figure 5, on one end of the spectrum197 is a 
regulatory framework in which governmental entities are highly 
independent and isolated in their regulatory activities.  At the other end is 
a regulatory relationship characterized by close agency collaboration and 
regulatory coordination.  Accordingly, this dimension assumes some level 
of decentralization.  It may come into play whether or not there is 
                                                 
192
 Carlson, supra note 7, at 1100-01. 
193
 The Clean Air Act, for example, authorizes EPA to adopt technology-based emission 
controls for certain sources and pollutants, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411-7412 (2006)), but it allows 
states to adopt more stringent emission control standards in most areas.  Id. § 7416.   
194
  Adelman & Engel, supra note 7, at 1820-21 (2008); Ahdieh, supra note 147, at 892.   
195
 Engel, supra note 7, at 161, 179 (noting that “regulatory activity at one level . . . may 
be a stepping stone to regulation at the governing level that dual federalism proponents 
label ‘optimal’”). 
196
 See infra notes 298 to 307 and accompanying text. 
197
 As indicated infra, at notes 216 to 224 and accompanying text, it is more difficult to 
conceptualize the coordination-independence dimension as a simple spectrum ranging 
from greater to lesser degrees of coordination because coordination can be measured in 
different ways, including the frequency, duration, scope, and voluntariness of 
coordination.  It is typically simpler to determine with respect to a given substantive area 
or government function whether the authority to address that area or function is 
centralized or decentralized, or distinct or overlapping. 
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jurisdictional overlap among authorities, and, if so, whether that overlap is 
substantive and/or functional. 198   Coordination among agencies with 
distinct jurisdictional charges is possible, just as it is among those with 
overlapping responsibilities. 
Figure 5.  Independent versus Coordinated Authority  
 
1. Coordinated Authority  
In response to the considerable incentives and effects of regulatory 
fragmentation, some scholars and regulatory actors have called for more 
coordination among regulatory authorities.  Indeed, coordination exists or 
has been proposed over a wide range of substantive jurisdictions, such as 
natural resources, 199  food safety, 200  and bioterrorism. 201   Though 
                                                 
198
 If regulatory power is concentrated in one entity, the issue of whether that authority 
should be exercised in independent or coordinated fashion is moot (although the degree 
of coordination among employees or offices within a single agency can differ).   
199
 Many inter-jurisdictional natural resource management coordination regimes have 
been created.  See, e.g., Chesapeake Bay Program, 
http://www.chesapeakebay.net/index.aspx (last visited October 25, 2011); California 
Bay-Delta Authority (CBDA), http://calwater.ca.gov/calfed/ oversight/CBDA/index.html 
(last visited October 25, 2011).  For additional examples, see Bradley C. Karkkainen, 
Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. 
L.J. 189, 217–18 (2002). 
200
 See e.g., Title II, FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 
3885 (2011) (requiring the Departments of Homeland Security, Health and Human 
Services, Agriculture, Commerce, and EPA to coordinate in information collection, 
analysis, and reporting on foodborne illnesses, outbreak response planning, and technical 
assistance to local governments). 
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eliminating fragmentation or overlap may be implausible or even 
undesirable, many scholars have emphasized the value of agency dialogue 
and collaboration to reduce fragmentation’s adverse effects. 202  
Coordination can increase the effectiveness of government action by 
promoting exchanges of ideas and the pooling of the expertise of different 
agencies.203  Although efforts to coordinate require the investment of time 
and resources that need not be incurred when agencies act independently, 
some claim that these costs may be more than offset by reductions in 
duplication of effort and inconsistent action, so that coordination can 
result in a net administrative efficiency gain.204   
Scholars also argue that coordination can promote accountability by 
combating drift, shirking, and free-riding through facilitation of inter-
agency monitoring.205  Coordination also can promote accountability by 
providing governmental authorities the opportunity and even duty to 
review and serve as a check on other authorities in the performance of 
delegated governmental functions, thereby reducing the risk of regulator 
capture. 206   Each regulatory authority can essentially serve as an 
accountability check on the others.207  Finally, the coordinated exercise of 
multi-jurisdictional authority can promote fairness by minimizing the 
imposition of inconsistent or redundant demands on regulated entities.208 
                                                                                                                         
201
 For example, the Drinking Water Security and Safety Amendments, adopted as part of 
the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. 
L. No. 107-188 §§ 401- 403, 116 Stat. 594, 682-87 (2002), requires coordination, led by 
EPA, to abate and respond to threats to drinking water infrastructure security.  See 
generally Steven D. Shermer, The Drinking Water Security and Safety Amendments of 
2002: Is America’s Drinking Water Infrastructure Safer Four Years Later?, 24 UCLA J. 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 355, 395-96 (2005-2006). 
202
 See, e.g., EUGENE BARDACH, GETTING AGENCIES TO WORK TOGETHER: THE PRACTICE 
AND THEORY OF MANAGERIAL CRAFTSMANSHIP (1998) (providing recommendations for 
fostering interagency collaboration); Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 7, at 66-67 (discussing 
a system of “weak ties” for alleviating the effects of fragmentation). 
203
 Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1185 (noting potential for coordination to improve 
decisionmaking by adding data and expertise and diversifying perspectives). 
204
 Id. at 1183. 
205
 Id. at 1189 (noting that coordination can “control drift by providing structured 
opportunities for agencies to account to each other”). 
206
 See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1186 (“Agencies will be harder to isolate and 
neutralize to the extent that their approaches are aligned.”). 
207
 Affording government officials access to information on the performance of other 
regulators can provide increased capacity to pressure those other regulators to comply 
with regulatory requirements. See Camacho, supra note 186, at 74-75. 
208
 Cf. Thomas McInerney, Putting Regulation Before Responsibility: Towards Binding 
Norms of Corporate Social Responsibility, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 171, 195 (2007) 
(discussing “efforts of state regulators to coordinate their regulatory approaches and 
ensure equitable treatment in international negotiations”); Maribeth Wilt-Seibert, 
Unemployment Compensation for Employees of Educational Institutions: How State 
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Recently, a number of scholars and government officials have 
examined the various characteristics of interagency coordination.209  For 
several reasons, its definition is unsettled.  Different schools of 
organizational theory seek to explain institutional coordination, and their 
definitions differ from one another.210  In addition, coordination can take 
any number of forms.  Coordination can be formal or informal.211  It can 
be long or short-term, and frequent or occasional.  Coordination can be 
voluntary and cooperative, 212  or mandated by legislative or executive 
action.213  The National Environmental Policy Act,214 discussed below,215 
is a prominent example of mandated, formal federal interagency 
coordination, but primarily only over agency planning and information-
gathering functions.   
Coordination also can be understood as a spectrum that ranges from 
less active inter-jurisdictional relationships to those that require significant 
synchronization.216   The range of coordination activities includes mere 
communication of adopted agency actions; 217  creation of formal or 
                                                                                                                         
Courts Have Created Variations on Federally Mandated Statutory Language, 29 U. 
MICH. J.L. REF. 585, 611 (1995) (encouraging coordination among states to ensure 
consistency and equitable treatment of similarly situated employees with respect to 
unemployment compensation benefits). 
209
 See e.g., Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4; Bradley, supra note 8; DeShazo & Freeman, 
supra note 7. 
210
 Gregg Macey, Environmental Crisis and the Paradox of Organizing, 2011 B.Y.U. L. 
REV. 2063, 2113 (2011) (mentioning different definitions of coordination in game theory, 
resource exchange, contingency theory, and transaction cost economics, among others).  
211
 See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1156 (describing the presence of considerable 
informal coordination that may or may not involve explicit communication between 
agencies).  See also Vermeule, supra note 95, at 22 (referring to “myriad” devices and 
mechanisms for achieving coordination, ranging from conversations to formal 
interagency memoranda of agreement); Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 3, at 43 (same). 
212
 See CRAIG W. THOMAS, BUREAUCRATIC LANDSCAPES: INTERAGENCY COOPERATION 
AND THE PRESERVATION OF BIODIVERSITY 24 (2003) (describing non-mandatory 
interagency cooperation).  Professor Marisam has identified three kinds of benefits that 
agencies may derive from cooperation with other agencies: the power they derive from 
influencing other agencies’ actions, the reputational benefits that may flow from 
contributing to the solution to another agency’s problem, and reciprocation from other 
agencies in the future.  Marisam, supra note 20, at 7. 
213
 See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1157.  
214
 42 U.S.C. 4321-4347. 
215
 See infra Part IV.A.3. 
216
 See Bradley, supra note 8, at 757-757 (describing spectrum of interagency 
coordination, including advisory, mandated interaction, veto power, and lobbying power). 
217
 Publication of public notices by government agencies in the Federal Register, 
https://www.federalregister.gov/, may be the most recognizable example at the federal 
level.  
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informal fora for inter-jurisdictional discussion; 218  providing to other 
governmental authorities an opportunity to comment on or respond to 
potential or proposed agency actions, whether discretionary 219  or 
mandatory;220 required consideration of or response to the comments or 
recommendations of other governmental authorities;221 the harmonization 
of agency activities through voting arrangements or mutual/consensus 
agreement; 222  and providing a governmental authority a de facto or 
express veto power over the activity of another authority.223  Of course, 
even each of these types of coordination can vary considerably.  For 
example, inter-jurisdictional agreements can range in scope, strength, and 
duration.224   
Because of this multiplicity of factors, it may at times be challenging 
to characterize one regulatory program as more or less coordinated than 
another.  To be sure, infrequent and short-term communication typically 
would be less coordinated than continued and enduring interaction; 
                                                 
218
 Formal examples of these include some functions of federal interagency task forces 
such as the Interagency Climate Change Adaptation Task Force 
(http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ceq/initiatives/adaptation), or the 
National Endowment for the Arts Federal Interagency Task Force 
(http://www.nea.gov/news/news11/Task-Force-Announcement.html). 
219
 See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1157 (describing “discretionary consultation”).  
For example, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act provides that when 
considering applications for pesticide registration, EPA “may consult” with any other 
federal agency.  See id. 
220
 See id.; Bradley, supra note 8, at 750-56 (discussing examples of mandatory agency 
consultation requirements); Biber, supra note 8, at 41-60 (same). 
221
 See Bradley, supra note 8, at 755 (describing how the Federal Power Act requires 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to consider input from fish and wildlife agencies 
before approving plans to construct new hydroelectric dams); Freeman & Rossi, supra 
note 4, at 1158 (citing EPA’s duty under federal pesticide laws to solicit opinions from 
Departments of Agriculture and Health and Human Services before promulgating 
regulations). 
222
 Some international treaties or interstate compacts, such as those that help govern use 
of the Colorado River, exemplify relatively robust forms of harmonization over standard 
setting.  See, e.g., Colorado River Compact of 1922, 70 CONG. REC. 324 (1928); Upper 
Colorado River Basin Compact, ch. 48, 63 Stat. 31 (1949).  Other versions focus 
primarily on the information-gathering function.  See, e.g., Great Lakes Basin Compact, 
Pub. L. No. 90-419, 82 Stat. 414, 415–17 (1968) (establishing the Great Lakes 
Commission to gather information and make non-binding recommendations to member 
states). 
223
 See Bradley, supra note 8, at 755-56 (discussing de facto veto and express veto 
powers). 
224
 CRAIG W. THOMAS, BUREAUCRATIC LANDSCAPES: INTERAGENCY COOPERATION AND 
THE PRESERVATION OF BIODIVERSITY 25 (2003) (“[S]pecific cooperative agreements 
should be measured in terms of their scope, strength, and duration, not simply their 
existence.  Scope refers to the range of issues covered. . . .  Strength refers to the binding 
nature of the agreements, ranging from verbal or tacit agreements to legally binding 
documents.  Duration refers to the endurance of an agreement.”). 
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cooperation on a few issues ordinarily involves less coordination than 
cooperation on many issues; and voluntary discussion between agencies 
usually would be less coordinated than mandatory consultation.  However, 
in some circumstances these various factors may point in different 
directions.  For example, voluntary weekly meetings between agencies to 
discuss issues of common concern may be considered more or less 
coordinated than a program that requires an agency to solicit and integrate 
comments from another annually.  Similarly, a short-term inter-
jurisdictional agreement involving a wide range of problems may be more 
or less coordinated than a long-term one on a narrow issue.  For purposes 
of this Article, however, we do not seek to devise a formula weighting 
these various factors for calculating where a particular government 
program rests along the coordination/independence dimension.  Instead, 
our point is that policymakers should consider whether the goals of a 
decentralized regime, whether distinct or overlapping, would best be 
promoted by requiring coordination or allowing independent exercise of 
authority.  Part of that assessment, of course, will entail consideration of 
various forms of coordination, each of which will have its own set of costs 
and benefits. 
2. Independent Authority  
Although coordination of regulatory efforts has theoretical 
effectiveness and administrative efficiency advantages, many of the calls 
for collaboration and the formation of coordinating regimes are reflexive, 
without any additional discussion of the costs of such additional regimes.  
Adding layers of consultation and collaboration requirements to an 
overlapping regulatory landscape will undoubtedly divert already limited 
agency resources, and it is worth considering whether the benefits of 
particular communications or collaborations among authorities are worth 
these opportunity costs.  Particularly if they are not designed properly, 
efforts at collaboration may not be worth the cost.225 
Moreover, both experience and a notable literature suggest loss of 
regulatory effectiveness through close agency coordination, particularly in 
the management of complex and uncertain regulatory problems.  At least 
some inter-jurisdictional collaborations in the past have failed to provide 
meaningful opportunities for cross-jurisdictional information sharing and 
collaboration.226  In discussing the benefits of divided regulatory authority, 
                                                 
225
 Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1182 (noting substantial “up-front investments 
required to coordinate agencies,” and that giving one agency veto power may elevate 
costs substantially by requiring extensive negotiations). 
226
 See Camacho, supra note 186, at 30-36 (analyzing inter-jurisdictional collaborations 
for managing resources in the Great Lakes and criticizing these efforts as serving as “yet 
another layer of fragmentation to the already disjointed regulatory landscape”). 
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numerous scholars have focused on the value of inter-jurisdictional 
competition in promoting socially optimal environmental regulation.  
Richard Revesz has argued in an influential article that interstate 
competition for industry should produce “an efficient allocation of 
industrial activity among the states.”227  Jonathan Adler argues that inter-
jurisdictional competition “can encourage policy innovation as 
policymakers seek to meet the economic, environmental, and other 
demands of their constituents,” while allowing competing authorities to 
act as environmental ‘laboratories’ developing new and improved ways of 
addressing environmental concerns.”228   Competition among authorities 
may be a contest for political credit, resources, or additional regulatory 
responsibilities.  Such competition is premised on the regulatory autonomy 
and independence of individual regulators from the activities of other 
government authorities.  Though these competition benefits are often 
ascribed as a feature of decentralization,229 it is the fact that regulators are 
acting independently rather than in coordinated fashion that yields the 
competitive dynamic.  
In addition, some forms of coordination may lead to an “anti-
commons” problem.230  The most acute forms of coordination, such as 
required harmonization of agency activities, include requiring all 
governmental authorities with jurisdiction over a particular problem to 
agree to a particular regulatory strategy.231  Some scholars have argued 
that a consensus decision rule can encourage holdouts and mutual vetoes 
that can result in the underutilization of resources.232   
Though arguments promoting regulatory independence are typically 
raised in conjunction with arguments promoting the devolution of 
regulatory authority to localities or states,233 regulatory independence can 
be valuable even among federal agencies.  In the context of analyzing the 
possible reorganization of the governmental provision of national security 
intelligence, Anne Joseph O’Connell has argued that competition among 
                                                 
227
 Revesz, supra note 6, at 1211-12.  See also Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative 
Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 
959, 961 (2007) (discussing how the Supreme Court’s modern federalism jurisprudence 
“privileges state sovereignty in order to promote efficiency and intergovernmental 
competition.”). 
228
 Adler, supra note 96, at 134. 
229
 See e.g., Cohen et al., supra note 1, at 710-11 (noting that centralization can diminish 
inter-agency competition and prevent efficient performance).   
230
 See generally Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the 
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 622-26 (1998). 
231
 See supra notes 217 to 223 and accompanying text. 
232
 See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 
549, 590 (2001); Heller, supra note 230, at 622-26. 
233
 See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 7, at 1102. 
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even federal authorities in some instances may be preferable to 
coordination because it may prevent “pernicious” collusion, encourage a 
creative “race to the top,” motivate correction of other agencies’ mistakes, 
and facilitate adaption to changing conditions.234   
In addition, O’Connell asserts that providing multiple governmental 
entities with regulatory authority over a particular problem can help 
prevent “group think”235 and increase the diversity of viewpoints.236  Any 
such benefits result from the existence of multiple governmental 
authorities acting autonomously. Finally, assuming alternative 
mechanisms for obtaining information about the performance of other 
regulators, inter-jurisdictional competition also may serve as a source of 
accountability.  Regulators may have substantial incentives to vigilantly 
review and challenge the actions of other intersecting authorities, 237 
particularly when there are inter-jurisdictional spillovers or attempts by an 
authority to obtain a competitive advantage. 
As in the case of the distinctness/overlap dimension,238 proponents of 
both coordination and independence have identified accountability 
benefits.  Both accounts note the potential for one agency armed with 
information about what others are doing to serve as a check on the failures 
of co-regulators.  Whether one finds one account or the other more 
convincing in a particular context may turn on a number of factors, 
including what is the particular governmental function at issue.  It also 
may depend on whether this checking function is likely to be best 
promoted by the relatively greater access to information about the 
activities of co-regulators among coordinating agencies, or by the 
potentially greater willingness of competing as opposed to coordinating 
agencies to call other agencies to account for drift, shirking, capture, or 
other forms of regulatory failure. 
In some circumstances, then, maintaining the independence of 
agencies and limiting cooperation may be more important for managing 
                                                 
234
 O’Connell, supra note 1, at 1677-78. 
235
 See IRVING JANIS, VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK 8-9 (1972) (coining the term “groupthink” 
as a product of cohesive ingroups “when the members’ strivings for unanimity override 
their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action.”).  See also Susan 
Cain, The Rise of the New Groupthink, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2012 (citing research 
showing that brainstorming sessions do not stimulate creativity). 
236
 O’Connell, supra note 1, at 1676.  Though Professor O’Connell focuses on this as a 
benefit of regulatory redundancy, it is more properly understood as a feature of whether 
the applicable regulators are independent from each other.  
237
 Cf. Engel, supra note 7, at 178–79 (discussing how intersecting agencies can promote 
accountability by monitoring each other’s compliance). 
238
 See supra notes 151-203 and accompanying text. 
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certain regulatory problems than a heavily collaborative model.  Most 
prominently, depending on the governmental function at issue, regulator 
independence may be more consistent with (and better promote) the 
redundancy benefits of overlapping jurisdiction than a heavily coordinated 
model.  Such a circumstance might exist during periods of change,239 
where there is considerable uncertainty, harm may be catastrophic, and 
prevention or mitigation of such harm by one of the independent 
authorities is possible (for example, in prevention of terrorism attack or 
natural disaster).240 
IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FUNCTIONAL JURISDICTION AND THE 
DIMENSIONS OF GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY  
 As one scholar has noted, “arguing that lines of organization are 
entirely inconsequential is likely to be as difficult as arguing that lines of 
geographic jurisdiction are inconsequential.”241   A variety of academic 
disciplines suggest “that formal lines of authority, jurisdictional limits, and 
formal hierarchical arrangements should be expected to change how legal 
mandates are carried out.”242   This Article focuses on two aspects of 
agency institutional structure that we believe have not been fully 
appreciated in the literature:  the role of functional jurisdiction in 
allocating agency authority, introduced in Part II, and the existence of (and 
relationships among) three different dimensions of governmental authority 
introduced in Part III.   
 
 Section A below documents the neglect of functional jurisdiction in 
both academic and political considerations of agency structure and 
illustrates why it is important to differentiate between substantive and 
functional jurisdiction in allocating government authority.  Section B 
substantiates the tendency of policymakers and scholars to conflate the 
three dimensions of authority and analyzes how the failure to fully 
appreciate the effects of allocating authority along each of the dimensions 
may defeat the goals of government programs or prevent them from 
realizing their full potential.  The conclusion that follows provides some 
tentative recommendations for fully integrating functional and 
dimensional considerations into the analysis of government structure. 
                                                 
239
 Ahdieh, supra note 147, at 890 (arguing for “intersystemic regulation” that minimizes 
inertia and promotes regulatory competition and learning, especially “amidst transition.”). 
240
 Cf. Marisam, supra note 20, at 224 (touting the benefits of redundancy “where there 
are potentially catastrophic or irreversible risks from agency failures”). 
241
 Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, “Securing” the Nation: Law, Politics, and Organization 
at the Federal Security Agency, 1939-1953, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 587, 644 (2009). 
242
 Id.  According to Cuellar, these include institutional sociology, political economy, and 
social psychology.  Id. 
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A. The Importance of Appreciating Functional Jurisdiction 
 The literature on government organization and structure is a rich one.  
A few commenters have noted problems with organizing administrative 
agencies primarily based on substantive jurisdictional authority. 243  
Relatively little attention has been paid, however, to the possibility of 
allocating agency authority along functional as opposed to substantive 
lines.  Only a few scholars have identified the possible division of 
authority along functional lines 244  or noted the relative scarcity of 
functional divisions of government authority. 245   This tendency to 
emphasize substance rather than function is reflected in comparisons of 
centralized and decentralized, overlapping and distinct, and coordinated 
and independent organizational structures. 
 
 Consideration of functional jurisdiction expands the options available 
in crafting government programs to deal with social problems.  Awareness 
of the option of allocating jurisdiction functionally provides a more 
nuanced framework for analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of 
alternative structural designs.  Moreover, by choosing to structure the 
exercise of various functions at a different point along each of the three 
dimensions, it may be possible for policymakers to harness the advantages 
of certain dimensions when they are particularly prominent for certain 
governmental functions while minimizing the shortcomings if they exist 
for others.  Through the prism of governmental function, legislators can 
better understand and then design allocations of authority to promote 
chosen regulatory goals. 
                                                 
243
 See, e.g., Elizabeth Glass Geltman & Andrew E. Skroback, Reinventing the EPA to 
Conform with the New American Environmentality, 23 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 6-12 
(1998) (discussing problematic development of EPA’s media-specific enforcement 
approach); Peter J. Fontaine, EPA’s Multimedia Enforcement Strategy: The Struggle to 
Close the Environmental Compliance Circle, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 31, 50 (1993) 
noting that EPA’s organizational structure and culture have produced separate program 
offices with their own parochial agendas).  See also Matthew C. Waxman, National 
Security Federalism in the Age of Terror, 64 STAN. L. REV. 289, 350 (2012) (suggesting 
reform of “specific counterterrorism intelligence functions, to set policy-appropriate 
balances of centralization and localization”). 
244
 See, e.g., Geltman & Skroback, supra note 243, at 10 (discussing functional 
organization at EPA); Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1145 (discussing “overlapping 
agency functions . . . (as when two agencies share enforcement authority over the same 
malfeasance)” ). 
245
 David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs, 
113 YALE L.J. 955, 988 (2004).  For further discussion analogizing the issues involved in 
agency organization to those in organizing business entities, and citing some of the 
literature on the industrial organization of firms, see Vermeule, supra note 104, at 21; 
Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 3, at 19. 
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1. Functional Jurisdiction and the Centralization-Decentralization 
Dimension 
Though there is an extensive literature on the advantages and 
disadvantages of centralized and decentralized governmental authority, 
this literature largely neglects the significance of functional jurisdiction.  
Academics frequently offer arguments for or against centralized authority 
without considering whether the persuasiveness of those arguments differs 
depending on the agency function involved.246  Similarly, when creating or 
reorganizing governmental institutions, legislatures often give short shrift 
to differentiating based on governmental function the assessment of 
possible benefits of creating more or less centralization.247 
The failure to consider on a function-by-function basis whether 
centralized or decentralized authority is appropriate may lead to missed 
opportunities for better achieving policy goals by centralizing some 
functions but providing for the exercise of decentralized authority for 
others.  This is because the tradeoffs among competing values may differ 
based on function.  Centralizing authority to gather scientific or technical 
information, for example, may provide significant economies of scale, 
while the need to experiment and take advantage of local expertise may be 
minimal.248  The case for centralizing the task of accumulating the data 
needed for effective health care regulation, for instance, appears strong.249 
In contrast, the diversity, expertise, democratic, and experimentation 
benefits of decentralizing standard-setting and/or implementation 
functions may be more important than the efficiencies that result from 
having only one regulator perform those functions and any unfairness of 
subjecting affected entities to multiple standards.  As Abigail Moncrieff 
and Eric Lee have argued with respect to health care regulation: 
                                                 
246
 See, e.g., Michael Halberstam, The Myth of “Conquered Provinces”: Probing the 
Extent of the VRA’s Encroachment on State and Local Autonomy, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 923, 
945-46 (2011) (“Centralized decisionmakers cannot adequately replicate or anticipate the 
experientially-based and contextual response of interested local actors who base their 
judgments on their ‘particular circumstances of time and place.’”); ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW, THE ECONOMY, AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 123, at 11 (arguing 
for benefits of centralized environmental authority without regard to functional 
differences); Dornbos, supra note 94, at 17 (discussing the benefits of decentralization 
without mentioning functional differences). 
247
 See, e.g., NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, 
THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 399-419 (2004) (discussing unification of national 
security/intelligence operations, but not potential for making different judgments on 
centralization based on governmental function). 
248
 See 6, supra note 6, at 623. 
249
 See, e.g., Abigail R. Moncrieff & Eric Lee, The Positive Case for Centralization in 
Health Care Regulation: The Federalism Failures of the ACA, 20-SPG KAN. J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 266, 276 (2011). 
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If the states choose different policy approaches to manage the costs of, 
quality of, and access to healthcare, then regulators might learn which 
approaches work and which do not. At a minimum, regulators would 
learn more through the states’ various attempts than they ever could from 
a single, uniform national policy.250 
Thus, it may make sense to centralize some functions but not others.  
Structuring agency authority without regard to differences based on the 
particular governmental function may unnecessarily sacrifice important 
values. 
The enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010251  illustrates the benefits of drawing functional 
distinctions in determining whether to create centralized or decentralized 
authority.  The Obama Administration opposed preemption of stricter state 
regulatory protections,252 and the statute limits the authority of agencies 
such as the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) and Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to preempt state regulation.253  Thus, 
Dodd-Frank preserves decentralized standard-setting.  According to the 
General Accountability Office (GAO), however, Dodd-Frank’s delegation 
of authority to the CFPB to assist in improving the financial literacy and 
education of individual consumers of financial products, services, and 
concepts meant that fourteen federal agencies are now responsible for 
administering sixteen significant federal financial literacy programs or 
activities.254  The GAO concedes the potential benefits of having multiple 
federal agencies involved in financial literacy efforts, including the ability 
to take advantage of “deep and long-standing expertise and experience 
addressing a specific issue area.” 255   But the resulting multiplicity of 
authority “increases the risk of inefficiency and duplication of efforts,”256 
particularly in light of the substantial “similarities in mission between 
CFPB’s statutory responsibilities and those of certain other federal 
                                                 
250
 Id. at 276. 
251
 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
252
 See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW 
FOUNDATION 61(2009) (Obama Administration white paper proposing financial 
regulatory reform).  For further discussion of the background of the white paper, see 
Todd J. Zywicki, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Savior or Menace?, 
81GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2130942, at 5-6. 
253
 Edward F. Greene, The Limits of “Name-and-Shame” in International Financial 
Regulation, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1083, 1094-95 (2012). 
254
 U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, OVERLAP OF PROGRAMS SUGGESTS 
THERE MAY BE OPPORTUNITIES FOR CONSOLIDATION, GAO-12-588, at 9 (July 2012), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592849.pdf.  
255
 Id. at 14.  
256
 Id. 
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entities.”257 The vesting in the CFPB of a significant role in enhancing 
consumer financial protection was an opportunity to consolidate federal 
financial literacy efforts in a more efficient and effective way.258  The 
GAO urged policymakers to consider consolidating authority over 
financial literacy information to avoid overlap, duplication, and 
inefficiency.259 Whether the GAO’s assessment is ultimately convincing 
or not, this example suggests that the pros and cons of centralization and 
decentralization may differ by function, and that policymakers should 
carefully consider the possibility of different organizational structures for 
different functions. 
2. Functional Jurisdiction and the Overlapping-Distinct Dimension 
As with analyses of the appropriate scale of government, a focus on 
functional jurisdiction makes clear that decisions on whether to provide 
for jurisdictional overlap are not an all-or-nothing proposition. Simply 
because two agencies share substantive jurisdiction does not mean that 
they overlap if their functional jurisdictions are distinct.  Unfortunately, 
proponents and detractors of overlapping jurisdiction often ignore whether 
agency jurisdictions overlap functionally, losing an opportunity to 
accommodate some of the accountability benefits of overlap while 
minimizing inefficiencies.  Finally, policymakers may be able to better 
achieve regulatory goals by designing governmental institutions to overlap 
for some functions but not others. 
Congress has sometimes chosen to define distinct realms of agency 
functional authority, even though the agencies involved share substantive 
jurisdictions.  For example, Congress vested in one agency the authority to 
adopt and in another the authority to enforce occupational safety 
standards. 260   Similarly, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 261  vested 
authority over the service aspects of immigration, including asylum and 
naturalization, in the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services,262 while 
placing immigration enforcement duties in the hands of the U.S. Customs 
                                                 
257
 Id. at 15, 19. 
258
 Id. at 20. 
259
 Id. at 20-21. 
260
 See George Robert Johnson, Jr., The Split-Enforcement Model: Some Conclusions 
from the OSHA and MSHA Experiences, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 315, 330 (1987); Freeman & 
Rossi, supra note 4, at 1150. 
261
 Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 6 
U.S.C.). 
262
 See http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis.  
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and Border Protection.263  Though both agencies have jurisdiction over 
immigration, their authority is largely distinct because there is little 
overlap in functional jurisdiction. 
Yet in other cases, opportunities for promoting more efficient and 
effective regulation through the creation of distinct functional divisions of 
authority may have been missed.  Detractors of overlap often focus on the 
inefficiencies and ineffectiveness of duplicative regulation, concluding 
that the solution should be agency consolidation.264  In 1939, for example, 
President Franklin Roosevelt used authority derived from the 
Reorganization Act of 1939 265  to combine half a dozen agencies 
responsible for matters dealing with health care, economic security, and 
education into a new subcabinet-level agency, the Federal Security 
Agency (FSA).266  Roosevelt justified the consolidation by highlighting 
the efficiency that would result by combining agencies with shared 
substantive jurisdiction over matters such as medical research, civil 
defense, national security, social security, federal education assistance, 
weapons development, and food and drug regulation.267   
An institutional configuration characterized by shared substantive 
authority but not functional overlap, however, might also have addressed 
the same concerns.  By eliminating duplication of functions, the regime 
would help minimize administrative costs, the risk of over-regulation, and 
the imposition of inconsistent mandates that created uncertainty and 
unfairness.  Retaining shared substantive authority, however, might also 
preserve the accountability benefits from having multiple authorities 
involved in the regulatory process—albeit in charge of distinct functions.  
In this way, it is possible that Roosevelt could have achieved similar 
efficiencies, and perhaps even more effective regulation, by retaining 
shared substantive authority but minimizing overlap by allocating distinct 
functional duties to each agency. 
Relatedly, attention to functional jurisdiction allows policymakers to 
focus on whether there are good reasons to decrease overlap for one 
function but maintain or increase it for another.  A few scholars, such as 
Jody Freeman and Jim Rossi, have helpfully recognized that the 
arguments in favor of creating overlapping or distinct authority may differ 
                                                 
263
 See http://www.cbp.gov/; The Honorable Asa Hutchinson, Holes in the Fence: 
Immigration Reform and Border Security in the United States, Keynote Address, 59 
ADMIN. L. REV. 533, 537 (2007). 
264
 See supra notes 154 to 266 and accompanying text. 
265
 3 U.S.C. § 45a (1946). 
266
 See supra notes 9 to 21 and accompanying text. 
267Id. at 592. 
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depending on the particular governmental function involved.268  Yet, when 
most scholars or agencies make assertions promoting overlapping 
jurisdiction, they appear to underappreciate the significance of 
differentiating along this dimension based on agency function and give 
short shrift to whether overlap is appropriate or effective for all 
governmental functions.269  Proponents of overlapping jurisdiction usually 
focus on the effectiveness and accountability benefits of redundant 
institutions, especially for significant or irreplaceable resources or for 
situations in which massive costs are anticipated if regulatory failure 
occurs.270  Yet the assessment of whether these redundancy benefits are 
worth the inefficiency costs may differ from function to function.  
Policymakers might structure authority differently along the overlap-
distinctness dimension because the relative value of efficiency and 
redundancy differ based on the task at issue.  Redundant development of 
information on the health risks of pollutant exposures at different levels, 
for example, may create waste without improving significantly the quality 
of the output. 271   On the other hand, the efficiency gains of vesting 
exclusive standard-setting or enforcement authority in one regulator may 
not justify the loss of the safety net that results from having multiple 
enforcement authorities to protect against ineffective or absent 
enforcement by a single agency.272  In short, failure to consider whether 
overlapping or distinct authority is preferable on a function-by-function 
basis may result in the unnecessary sacrifice of effectiveness to achieve 
efficient governance, or vice versa. 
                                                 
268
 See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1146 (arguing that overlapping authority to 
enforce the antitrust laws may create inefficiencies and disagreements over enforcement 
policy); id. at 1147 (noting that two agencies set food safety standards, but that they bring 
different kinds of expertise to the effort). 
269
 See, e.g., Aagaard, supra note 152, at 286-300 (addressing costs and benefits of 
overlap, mostly without drawing clear distinctions based on function). 
270
 See, e.g., Katherine A. Trisolini, All Hands on Deck: Local Governments and the 
Potential for Bidirectional Climate Change Regulation, 62 STAN. L. REV. 669, 745-46 
(2010) (describing critical role of local governments in reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions to “create redundancy to compensate for regulatory failures”). 
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 Cf. Sandra B. Zellmer, The Devil, the Details, and the Dawn, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 941, 
1048 (2000) (discussing the value of EPA’s technical expertise in adopting air quality 
standards). 
272
 See Engel, supra note 7, at 179-80 (discussing “regulatory safety net” provided by 
overlapping state and federal jurisdiction over pollution regulation and enforcement). 
There may be a strong argument for distinct authority, however, if there is directly 
conflicting authority by regulators (at whatever level of government) without a 
discernible difference in subject-matter competence. 
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3. Functional Jurisdiction and the Coordination-Independence 
Dimension 
A few scholars have addressed the need for agency coordination across 
not only substantive but also functional domains, recognizing that it may 
be advisable to require coordinated action for some governmental 
functions but to allow independent agency action for others. 273   In 
discussing the federal government’s approach to agricultural policy, for 
example, David Weisbach and Jacob Nussim posit that the Internal 
Revenue Service is well situated to control financing through investment 
subsidies, while the Department of Agriculture is the best agency to 
regulate farmers more generally through standard-setting and related 
functions.274  They conclude that “separate agencies for each function, and 
the resulting lack of coordination, could be optimal.”275 
More frequently, however, those analyzing agency structure promote 
either increased independence or coordination without fully appreciating 
or even acknowledging the significance of functional jurisdiction. 276  
Because the arguments for coordinated or independent authority are likely 
to vary with the governmental function in question, this oversight creates 
the risk that analysts will overlook opportunities to achieve the optimal 
balance of policy goals by coordinating some functions but taking 
advantage of the exercise of independent authority for others.  For 
instance, it may make sense to strike the balance between avoiding the 
inefficiency or inconsistency (arising from uncoordinated action) and 
avoiding groupthink (through independent agency authority) differently 
for the financing or planning and standard-setting functions.  Policymakers 
should not elide these differences by confining their analysis solely to the 
extent of coordination in substantive authority. 
Two examples illuminate the potential value of situating disparate 
agency functions at different points along the coordination-independence 
dimension.  The first involves requiring multiple intelligence agencies to 
report to a single supervisor, the Director of National Intelligence.  The 
9/11 Commission and the Center for Strategic International Studies 
expressed concerns that such coordination might suppress innovation and 
competition among intelligence agencies, and that enhanced coordination 
                                                 
273
 See, e.g., Arnold M. Howitt & Herman B. “Dutch” Leonard, Katrina and the Core 
Challenges of Disaster Response, 30-WTR FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 215, 220 (2006). 
274
 Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 245, at 994-95. 
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 Id.  The authors note the need to recognize “that desirable separation of functions into 
divisions is going to lead to lack of coordination.”  Id. 
276
 See, e.g., DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 7, at 2221, 2232, 2253 (discussing forms of 
agency coordination, but failing to differentiate between functional and substantive 
coordination). 
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is likely to discourage opposing views precisely when they are most 
needed. 277   Others have pointed out, however, that the value of 
competition may be outweighed by the risk that agencies taking 
inconsistent approaches in acting on accumulated intelligence will operate 
inefficiently, if not at cross-purposes, thwarting achievement of efforts to 
thwart terrorist attacks.278  Yet these seemingly dueling arguments are not 
necessarily irreconcilable; the detractors of coordination were focused 
primarily on the gathering and analysis of intelligence information, while 
proponents were focusing on governmental action in response.  In these 
circumstances, the arguments for allowing agencies to act independently 
may be stronger for the information-analysis function than for the 
implementation function, and effective regime design might seek to limit 
coordination in the former but promote it in the latter. 
The second example involves a comparison of the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Endangered Species Act 
(ESA).  NEPA requires each agency proposing a major federal action to 
consult with and solicit the comments of other federal agencies with 
jurisdiction or special expertise during the process of preparing 
environmental impact statements on such proposed actions. 279   The 
proposing agency must incorporate or respond to any comments in the 
final EIS. 280   In addition, NEPA created an agency, the Council on 
Environmental Quality (CEQ) to supervise compliance by other agencies 
with their NEPA evaluation and disclosure responsibilities, a task it has 
undertaken through the issuance of binding regulations that govern NEPA 
implementation by other agencies. 281   NEPA thus provides for 
coordination across the federal government of information-gathering and 
planning responsibilities282 concerning agency actions that may affect the 
environment.  NEPA does little, however, to require agencies to undertake 
or coordinate monitoring of the actual environmental impacts of activities 
for which impact statements have been prepared once implementation of 
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 O’Connell, supra note 1, at 1685. 
278
 See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1135 (arguing that although overlap allows 
harnessing of specialized agencies’ expertise and competencies, “that potential can be 
wasted if the agencies work at cross-purposes or fail to capitalize on one another’s unique 
strengths and perspectives.”); Aaron J. Saiger, Obama’s “Czars” for Domestic Policy 
and the Law of the White House Staff, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2577, 2588 (2011) (noting 
need for coordination to control illegal drugs because law enforcement and health care 
agencies were ignorant of or hostile to each other’s approaches). 
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 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006). 
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 40 C.F.R. § 1503.4(a). 
281
 Id. § 1500.3. 
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 See id. §§ 1501.1, 1501.2(a). 
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those activities begins.283  NEPA would likely have been more effective at 
actually minimizing the adverse environmental consequences of federal 
agency activities if it had extended coordination obligations to monitoring 
of the effects of project activities. 
Some NEPA critics go one step further by disapproving the statute’s 
absence of any substantive content.  The Supreme Court has clearly ruled 
that NEPA’s mandates are procedural in nature, not substantive.284  Critics 
have urged that it be amended (or reinterpreted by the courts) to infuse 
substantive content into its environmental protection mandates.285  Such a 
change would prioritize environmental values in a way that NEPA does 
not currently do.  Short of that change, one way to increase the CEQ’s 
coordinating role would be to vest in it authority to remand projects on the 
basis of their adverse environmental effects, which would provide a 
stronger form of agency coordination than NEPA now provides. 
Although such a strengthening of NEPA’s coordination mechanisms is 
unlikely to occur any time soon, the ESA provides a model for what that 
form of coordination might look like.  The ESA mandates federal 
interagency coordination not only in information generation and planning, 
but also in project implementation.  Section 7 requires federal agencies to 
avoid actions that will “jeopardize the continued existence” of listed 
endangered or threatened species or “result in the destruction or 
modification of” their critical habitat.286  It requires an agency to consult 
with the National Marine Fisheries Service (for marine species) or Fish 
and Wildlife Service (for freshwater and wildlife species) on any agency 
action which is likely to jeopardize a listed species. 287   The formal 
consultation process concludes when the Service issues a biological 
opinion on whether the proposed activity is likely to jeopardize a listed 
species or adversely modify critical habitat, suggesting reasonable and 
prudent alternatives (RPAs) that would avoid such harms.  The opinion 
may also include an incidental take statement conditionally authorizing the 
take of individual species members, provided the agency complies with 
the specified RPAs.288  According to the Supreme Court, the Service’s 
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 The CEQ regulations provide only that “[a]gencies may provide for monitoring to 
assure that their decisions are carried out and should do so in important cases.” 40 C.F.R. 
§ 1505.3. 
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 See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 
519, 558 (1978). 
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 James T.B. Tripp, Streamlining NEPA’s Environmental Review Process: Suggestions 
for Agency Reform, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 74, 76-77 (2003) (citing critiques to this 
effect). 
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 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). 
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 Id. 
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 Id. § 1536(b)(3), (4); 50 C.F.R. §402.14.  
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Biological Opinion has a powerful coercive effect.289  If the action agency 
ignores the RPAs, it must articulate its reasons for disagreement.  It runs a 
substantial risk if those reasons turn out to be wrong,290 placing it at risk of 
violating the statutory prohibition on the taking of listed species,291 while 
an agency that complies with the terms of an incidental take statement is 
shielded from a finding that it has violated that prohibition.292 
Though both NEPA and the ESA require inter-agency coordination, 
the ESA’s coordination mandates extend beyond information-gathering 
and planning to project implementation, illustrating that it is possible to 
require coordination for some functions but not others.  Policymakers 
should consider the benefits and disadvantages of coordination and 
independence on a function-by-function basis.  They may conclude that 
coordination of one function will provide efficiency and policy 
effectiveness gains that justify the administrative costs of coordination and 
the risk of groupthink that stifles innovation.  For a different function, 
however, the balance may point in a different direction. 
B. The Importance of Appreciating the Dimensions of Authority 
The literature on how to apportion substantive authority is much more 
extensive than the literature on functional authority.293  Nevertheless, this 
literature is incomplete for two reasons.  First, scholars and policymakers 
often fail to consider how authority should be allocated along each of the 
dimensions described in Part III.  Second, even when they do consider 
multiple dimensions of authority, they sometimes conflate the advantages 
and disadvantages of locating authority along two or more of the 
dimensions.  Regardless of the particular dimensions that are being 
neglected or conflated, the bottom line is the same – incomplete vetting of 
the organizational choices and lost opportunities to foster primary goals or 
achieve complementary objectives.  Separating out the dimensions as we 
suggest will preserve as many policy options as possible among competing 
organizational structures.  Where to situate a particular program along 
each dimension should reflect consideration of the values promoted by 
each dimensional choice and prioritization of any conflicting values. 
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 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 169 (1997). 
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 Id. at 170.  The taking prohibition is codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2006). 
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 16 U.S.C. § 1536(o)(2). 
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 The literature on the federalism aspects of government programs is particularly 
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Decentralization as a Risk-Return Trade-off, 53 J. L. & ECON. 359, 361 (2010); supra 
note 6. 
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The three dimensions should not be viewed in isolation; in all but one 
situation, they are iterative.  If policymakers with authority to contemplate 
the creation of a new government program or the reorganization of an 
existing one choose to vest all authority to administer the program in a 
single centralized governmental entity, they need not consider either of the 
other two dimensions.294  As Figure 6 below demonstrates, however, if the 
desired program is decentralized (either among governmental levels or 
within a level), then more than one agency will necessarily have authority 
(unless the geographic boundaries of each regulator’s jurisdiction are 
mutually exclusive). 295   If more than one governmental entity has 
jurisdiction, policymakers have meaningful institutional design options 
beyond simply choosing a decentralized structure.  The remaining options 
involve whether to vest the two or more agencies that will have 
jurisdiction with distinct or overlapping authority, and whether to allow or 
require those agencies to act independently of one another or to allow or 
require coordinated action. 
                                                 
294
 Even in this circumstance, the single institution may exercise substantive authority 
that is at least peripherally within the realm of other entities’ substantive powers, both 
within and outside the jurisdiction, and there may be value in considering coordination 
with these other entities.  In addition, agencies are not monolithic entities, and different 
divisions or offices within a single agency may provide choices along the overlap and 
coordination dimensions. 
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 Both New York City and Los Angeles have the authority to adopt land use controls 
such as zoning laws.  In most respects, this Article is not concerned with the relationship 
between the authority of those two regulators.  They do not have overlapping jurisdiction, 
as this Article uses that term, even though both are authorized to regulate land use, 
because no landowner is subject to the jurisdiction of both agencies.  The structuring of 
agency authority to allow geographically distinct regulators to act is relevant to the 
centralization-decentralization dimension, however, to the extent that decentralization is 
justified by the desire to promote experimentation and innovation by multiple regulators. 
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Figure 6.  Dimension Relationships  
 
The interactions among the dimensions are important because they 
may act synergistically or at cross-purposes with one another.  Although 
the dividing lines among the dimensions will in some instances blur at the 
margins,296  we suggest that the values promoted by the poles of each 
dimension are sufficiently different from one another that there is value in 
considering each choice sequentially. 
Thus, for example, suppose that policymakers have chosen to create a 
program of both federal and state authority in order to achieve the 
diversity, experimentation, and accountability benefits of a decentralized 
regime.  They should next consider whether they prefer that overlapping 
authority among federal and state regulators (to provide redundancy and a 
safety net against inactivity or capture by regulators at one level), or 
instead prefer to promote the efficiencies resulting from the creation of 
distinct regulatory responsibilities. 297   Finally, policymakers should 
consider whether they place a higher priority on achieving the efficiencies 
of coordinated regulation among multiple regulators and on minimizing 
the risk of agencies working at cross-purposes, or the effectiveness 
                                                 
296
 Efforts to reduce overlap may bleed over into centralization, for example.  See supra 
note 160 and accompanying text. 
297
 See Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 3, at 17 (urging that issues concerning overlap be 
considered in terms of the optimal level of agency and regulatory redundancy/overlap – a 
framing which necessarily requires balancing the costs and benefits of such strategies 
compared to the alternatives). 
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advantages that stem from allowing regulators to act independently so as 
to avoid groupthink that may stifle the experimentation benefits provided 
by decentralized government. 
The discussion below elaborates on the importance of the dimensions 
of authority, both individually and in relation to one another.  It illustrates 
how regulatory programs may be adversely affected by neglect or 
conflation of the consequences of moving along each of the dimensions. 
1. Conflation of the Overlap/Distinct and Decentralized/Centralized 
Dimensions 
As Jody Freeman and Jim Rossi have pointed out, “[i]nstances of 
overlap and fragmentation are not rare or isolated. They can be found 
throughout the administrative state, in virtually every sphere of social and 
economic regulation, in contexts ranging from border security to food 
safety to financial regulation.” 298   A growing literature promotes 
overlapping jurisdiction based on its capacity to provide diversity, 
experimentation, and expertise benefits, but some scholars appear to 
commingle the advantages of overlap with those of decentralized 
authority.299  For example, some have promoted overlapping jurisdiction 
based on its capacity to take advantage of the exercise of authority that is 
tailored to particular regulatory circumstances or to benefit from unique 
agency expertise. 300   Such arguments conflate overlap with 
decentralization because the benefits of accommodating diversity of 
circumstances or taking advantage of agency expertise are more 
appropriately attributed to decentralized governance.301  Put another way, 
it is the feature of decentralization that allows for localized tailoring of 
regulation and the application of an array of expertise, not the fact that the 
authority is overlapping. 
Likewise, some proponents of overlapping jurisdiction argue that a key 
benefit is that it allows significant experimentation opportunities.  One 
scholar, for example, in discussing the benefits of redundancy, posits that 
“[d]iffering perspectives allow agencies to function more like laboratories, 
                                                 
298
 Freeman & Rossi, supra note 4, at 1134. 
299
 See, e.g., O'Connell, supra note 1, at 1659 (equating redundancy and decentralization); 
id. at 1673 n.104 (same, but recognizing that differences may exist). 
300
 See, e.g., Doran, supra note 173, at 1820-21 (stating that information theory “implies 
that the institutional determinants of redundancy usually facilitate specialization”); id. at 
1849 (discussing theory that Congress enacts redundant programs to pursue informational 
efficiency).  
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 For a description of the expertise and diversity benefits of decentralization, see supra 
notes 93-96 and accompanying text. 
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by devising new solutions to new problems.” 302   Another claims that 
redundancy “enables a range of experts with diverse viewpoints to 
contribute to the lawmaking process and it fosters competition and rivalry 
among decisionmakers, leading to a level of innovation and creativity that 
is impossible to achieve with a single decisionmaking body.”303   Still 
others have asserted that overlapping authorities “are more likely to 
discover which instruments most effectively respond” to a particular 
problem.304  
These arguments largely also conflate decentralized with overlapping 
authority. 305   The opportunity to learn from the experiences of other 
jurisdictions that have adopted different regulatory strategies is more 
appropriately regarded as a benefit of decentralized governance. 306   If 
policymakers adopt a redundant governmental structure in order to 
achieve the diversity or experimentation benefits of having multiple 
regulators, they may fail to appreciate that though decentralization 
promotes those ends, a decentralized regime can be structured with either 
overlapping or distinct authority.  The choices along that dimension call 
for analysis of the tradeoff between the efficiency advantages of a system 
of distinct authority and the protections against capture and agency 
inaction307 provided by overlapping authority. 
Conflation of these two dimensions sometimes also occurs in the 
opposite direction.  Scholars have attributed to decentralization of 
authority the benefits of creating a regulatory safety net that protects 
against the risk of capture and agency inaction.308  Decentralized authority 
may not create such a safety net, however, if each agency is assigned a 
discrete substantive jurisdiction.  It is the overlap and coordination of 
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 Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most 
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 In rare circumstances when experimentation must occur quickly, such as when the 
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 See Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent 
Capital in Corporate Governance, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 281, 317 
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 See Katyal, supra note 302, at 2324 (discussing the risks of relying on one agency 
because “[w]hen one bulb blows, everything goes.’”).   
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 See, e.g., Aagaard, supra note 152, at 294-95. 
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jurisdiction among multiple agencies that may protect against capture and 
inaction, not decentralization.309 
Although overlap provides redundancy benefits, it also creates the 
potential for duplicative regulation that wastes agency resources, 
regulation that creates conflicting or onerous obligations for regulated 
entities, or inadequate regulation by agencies seeking to rely on (or blame) 
the efforts of peer agencies.310   A common response to the incentives 
toward either over-regulation or under-regulation caused by overlapping 
governance is to call for the consolidation of regulatory authority. 311 
Proponents of centralized authority argue that consolidation within a 
governmental level minimizes pursuit of divergent goals or inconsistent 
actions by multiple agencies that may interfere with agency missions.  
However, consolidation is not the only way to address inappropriate levels 
or methods of regulation.  Instead, policymakers can retain the same 
number of agencies and delegate distinct tasks to each.  Conflation of the 
overlap-distinctness and decentralization-centralization dimensions masks 
this option. 
 The reorganization of federal agencies to establish the Department of 
Homeland Security is illustrative.  Congress created the DHS in 2002 out 
of more fragmented federal authorities in part to reduce the potential for 
the numerous existing intelligence-gathering agencies to work at cross-
purposes. 312   Some have questioned whether the pre-2002 landscape 
actually was characterized by excessive overlap of agency authority.313  
Even if it was, however, it is not clear that consolidation effectively 
reduced inter-agency interference.  Professors Freeman and Rossi charge 
that the 2002 Act failed to eliminate overlapping and potentially 
conflicting functions in the new DHS.314 
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 See supra notes 182 to 185 and accompanying text.  The degree to which overlap 
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 See Cohen et al., supra note 1, at 683-84. 
313
 See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Outsourcing Is Not Our Only Problem, 76 GEO. WASH. 
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In such cases, policymakers may be well advised to consider 
delineating more distinct lines of substantive authority or allocating 
distinct functional authority to different agencies with jurisdiction over the 
same subject matter instead of centralizing authority through a reduction 
in the number of agencies.315 
2. Conflation of the Coordination/Independence and 
Decentralized/Centralized Dimensions 
It is tempting to consider substantial levels of coordination to be akin 
to centralized authority.  However, even at its most robust, coordination is 
a different characteristic of governance than centralization. 316   The 
benefits of centralization tend to be the opportunity to achieve economies 
of scale, the ability to address collective action problems (such as inter-
jurisdictional spillovers) more effectively that decentralized approaches 
can, and the achievement of fairness through uniformity and weakening of 
the power of factions.317  Coordination primarily promotes cost-effective 
government and reduces the risk that the acts of one authority will 
counteract or frustrate those of another.318   Though centralization may 
help decrease the costs of coordination, they seek fundamentally different 
goals. 
Yet, many policymakers and scholars have touted coordinated 
government as a way to take advantage of economies of scale.319  As 
Jacob Gersen has noted, the centralized regulatory review literature “often 
equates coordination with centralized control, even though centralization 
is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for coordination. Strong 
vertical control over subordinates may facilitate coordination, but there 
seems to be no shortage of lackadaisical supervisors in the world.”320  
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Likewise, extensive inter-jurisdictional coordination can certainly occur in 
a largely decentralized regime.321   
Though some may fail to differentiate coordination from 
centralization, others actually have conflated coordinated and 
decentralized authority.  Some scholars have advocated coordination as a 
way to garner the benefits of multiple perspectives, specialized 
knowledge, and opportunities for agencies to test new ideas.322  To be 
sure, some coordination of information between authorities must occur for 
these benefits to accrue.  However, because these diversity and expertise 
benefits more fundamentally rely on the existence of various authorities, 
we assert that these are primarily attributes of decentralization. 
Still other scholars conflate decentralization with independence.  
These commenters have asserted that a key attribute of decentralized 
governance is that it provides a way for governmental authorities to 
compete with each other and thus promote efficiency and effectiveness. 
According to one source, for example, “economic insights, such as the 
heterogeneity of preferences and the efficiency of the competitive process 
for government regulation, may lead to the conclusion that 
decentralization guarantees efficiency gains.”323   However, while some 
level of decentralization of governmental authority undoubtedly must exist 
for there to be inter-jurisdictional competition, it is not decentralization, 
but rather the independence of multiple agencies with jurisdiction over a 
problem, that provides the primary foundation for competition.  For 
example, lodging considerable governmental jurisdiction in only two or 
three national agencies might create a fairly centralized regulatory regime; 
yet such governmental authorities could be designed to be highly 
competitive. 324  Likewise, a fundamentally decentralized allocation of 
governmental authority might nonetheless involve considerable 
cooperation and collaboration between governmental authorities, hardly 
the hallmark of inter-jurisdictional competition.325 
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By conflating the coordination/independence and 
centralization/decentralization dimensions, scholars and policymakers lose 
an opportunity to better tailor the design of governmental authority.  If a 
policymaker’s goal is to achieve economies of scale or uniform and 
equitable regulatory treatment, then centralization is often the best way to 
do so.  If, however, a policymaker decides to create a decentralized regime 
to take advantage of the democracy, diversity, expertise, and 
experimentation benefits that such a structure is apt to provide, the 
policymaker should further consider whether decentralized power should 
be accompanied by coordination or independence among the multiple 
agencies authorized to address the problem in question.  That choice 
involves a tradeoff between the advantages of a fair and cost-efficient 
structure that minimizes the risk of conflicting policy approaches326 with a 
structure that avoids the administrative costs of coordinated action and 
fosters competition, while protecting against groupthink.  Conflation of 
the centralization/decentralization and coordination/independence 
dimensions may mask the important tradeoffs involved in situating a 
regime along the latter dimension. 
One example of a reorganization effort that may have failed to 
appreciate the option of moving along the coordination-independence 
dimension instead of the centralization-decentralization dimension is the 
reorganization of agency power over consumer financial products and 
services that resulted from enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010.327  
Dodd-Frank delegated to the newly created CFPB the combined authority 
of seven federal agencies previously responsible for protecting consumers 
of financial services.328  Part of the impetus for that consolidation was 
dissatisfaction with the competition between the OTS and the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) for new charters by banks and thrift 
institutions.  By lowering their standards, the OTS and the OCC competed 
for the ability to issue charters to banks and thrift institutions, which had 
the option of choosing to subject themselves to either regulator.329  As two 
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scholars explained, “[t]he combination of fee dependence on the part of 
the regulators and the ability of regulated institutions to credibly threaten 
to switch charters is thought by detractors to create a capture-ready 
environment, in which agencies become beholden to the industries that 
underwrite their budgets.”330  The existence of multiple agencies charged 
with regulating consumer financial transactions created a diffusion of 
responsibility and lax enforcement.331   Dodd-Frank consolidated in the 
CFPB federal regulatory functions (including research, information 
distribution, and standard-setting) over banks and thrifts as a way to 
eliminate inter-agency competition that reduced the effectiveness of 
regulation.332 
Greater centralization of regulatory power was not the only way to 
reduce destructive competition, however.  Indeed, the antidote for 
excessive competition is perhaps more logically found by moving toward 
the coordination end of the independence-coordination dimension.  
According to some assessments, congressional efforts through 
consolidation to streamline and eliminate destructive inter-agency 
competition did not fully succeed, as “Congress did not substantially 
reduce or consolidate existing federal regulators, as some had proposed,” 
and “information sharing and coordination remain significant challenges 
to the effective operation of the fragmented regime.”333  As these scholars 
recognized, Congress may have been better advised to require 
information-sharing and other forms of coordination of the activities of 
multiple bank and thrift regulators instead of consolidating authority in the 
hands of the CFPB. 334   At the very least, a move toward greater 
coordination (without centralization) should have been on the table as an 
option worth considering.  Allowing multiple agencies to retain authority 
but requiring them to coordinate might have reduced destructive (and 
unfair) inter-agency competition, while taking advantage of the expertise 
and experimentation benefits that decentralized governance may supply. 
A similar story may be told about the adoption of the Homeland 
Security Act in response to the events of 9/11, which is also discussed 
above in connection with conflation of the overlap/distinctness and 
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centralization/decentralization dimensions.335  Congress consolidated the 
authority of many federal agencies in the new DHS in part to reduce 
competition among agencies performing intelligence functions that was 
perceived as being counterproductive.336  Some critics have taken issue 
with the objective of eliminating competition, which they believe had 
yielded helpful policy innovations.337  Even if reduced competition was 
desirable, however, others have concluded that the creation of the DHS 
failed to increase the efficiency of intelligence-gathering functions338 and 
that coordination across agencies was in some instances better than within 
the sprawling new Department. 339   They claim that it may have been 
possible to accomplish the efficiency and effectiveness gains sought with 
the creation of the DHS through the creation of a much smaller White 
House-based agency that facilitated coordination at a fraction of the 
administrative costs entailed in the shifting of responsibilities from other 
agencies to the DHS. 340  A decision to increase coordination without 
centralizing authority previously exercised by many agencies within a 
single new Department also may have preserved the expertise built up by 
the agencies folded into the DHS.341 
3. Conflation of the Coordination/Independence and Overlap/Distinct 
Dimensions 
Another source of potential confusion is the conflation of coordination 
and overlap.  A discussion of wildfire management policy along the 
wildland-urban interface, for example, describes the governing regime as 
having shifted from one dominated by the U.S. Forest Service to one in 
which state and local governments now play a significant role.  In 
describing the benefits of this “overlapping authority regime,” the author 
refers to the strengthening of state and local firefighting resources through 
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increased funding, investment in the dissemination of best practices and 
standards, resource sharing, and, generally, the strengthening of 
interagency ties.342  However, resource and information sharing and the 
strengthening of interagency ties are more accurately attributed to a 
coordinated regime, not necessarily an overlapping one.  Multiple 
agencies with overlapping authority could work completely in ignorance 
of what agencies with shared authority are doing, or even at cross-
purposes.  Likewise, governmental authorities with little overlap in 
jurisdiction (such as peer agencies from different states) can and often do 
coordinate and learn from common experiences in their exercise of 
authority.343  
Similarly, some have conflated the opposite ends of these two 
dimensions—that is, distinct and independent authority.  Professor 
O’Connell, for example, has asserted that distinct authorities can avoid the 
groupthink to which redundant authority is prone.344  Groupthink is more 
appropriately regarded, however, as the byproduct of highly coordinated 
authority, and can be avoided by allowing and encouraging agencies to act 
independently (whether or not their respective jurisdictions overlap). 
Other scholars have identified a tradeoff between specialization and 
coordination.345  We regard these as two separate choices – overlap or 
distinctness (a form of specialization), and coordination or independence.  
The first pair deals largely with a tradeoff between effectiveness through 
the creation of redundant authorities and efficiency through the 
elimination of duplication of functions.  The latter, however, largely 
entails choosing between the effectiveness that results from reduced 
opportunities for agencies working at cross-purposes with one another, 
balanced against the reduced administrative costs resulting from avoidance 
of the need to coordinate and the enhanced effectiveness from averting 
groupthink.  The two dimensions both involve efficiency-effectiveness 
considerations, but they differ from one another. 
The principal problem with conflating the overlap/distinctness and 
coordination/independence dimensions is again the risk of missed 
opportunities or thwarted goals.  A policymaker may choose to require 
coordination among multiple regulators as a means of achieving cost-
effectiveness and reducing opportunities for conflicting approaches. 346  
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Unless the policymaker also considers whether the coordinating agencies 
should have overlapping or distinct authority, however, it may never 
address whether it is better to supplement those goals with a structure that 
creates redundancy as a means of creating a safety net against inaction, or 
instead with a structure that is designed to achieve the administrative 
efficiencies resulting from the creation of a distinct set of substantive 
authorities.347  Likewise, a policymaker initially may choose overlapping 
authority to create a safeguard against regulatory failure.  It should also 
consider, however, whether it prefers a coordinated approach that 
minimizes opportunities for working at cross-purposes or one that stresses 
the need to combat groupthink. 
A recent example of coordination of overlapping authority is the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 348  which 
requires the President to facilitate the sharing of information relating to 
terrorism among federal, state, and local entities.  In 2008, the Director of 
National Intelligence published a strategy declaring “the imperative need 
of moving beyond considering State and local government to be only ‘first 
responders,’ preferring instead to thinking [sic] of them as the first line of 
defense in a very deep line of information assets.” 349   The federal 
government, through the DHS, has since financed state-operated “fusion 
centers” to promote communication and coordination in the information 
gathering function among regional, state, and local authorities on 
intelligence matters.350 
The USA PATRIOT Act of 2011351 also sheds light on the relationship 
between the overlap/distinctness and coordination/independence 
dimensions.  A consensus developed that national security officials needed 
to share information to help them “connect the dots” that would allow the 
government to prevent future attacks.352  Notably, however, coordination 
did not necessarily mean the elimination of redundancy, which represents 
a different dimension in our typology.  Professor Nathan Sales explained 
that coupling coordination with redundancy facilitates information 
sharing, resulting in competitive analysis among intelligence agencies 
consulting a common pool of information, exposing policy makers to 
diverse perspectives, and counteracting “groupthink tendencies.”353 
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Though we concur that reliance on redundant authority is not 
inconsistent with coordination, we would characterize the structure created 
by the USA PATRIOT Act somewhat differently.  We regard competition 
as a by-product of independence, not redundancy (or overlap).  The Act 
actually seems to have required coordination among national security with 
respect to one function—information distribution or sharing—to promote 
efficiency and avoid waste.  At the same time, it encouraged competition 
through independent performance of a different function—information 
analysis—so as to garner to the benefits of competition and to avoid 
groupthink.354  
In short, by conflating the overlap/distinctness and 
coordination/independence dimensions, policymakers risk creating 
institutions unable to act in ways most likely to achieve regulatory goals.  
By requiring coordination of overlapping authority, for example, 
policymakers’ may forfeit the opportunity to reap the benefits of 
competition that might have resulted from encouraging overlapping 
regulators to exercise independent authority in carrying out a function 
such as information analysis.   
CONCLUSION 
Decisions on how to allocate governmental authority are critical to the 
fate of regulatory programs.  Unfortunately, scholars and policymakers 
routinely ignore how the nature of the governmental functions discussed in 
Part II may affect assessments of the comparative merits of allocating 
authority along the dimensions of governmental authority we distinguish 
in Part III..  They also regularly conflate these dimensions.  As Part IV 
demonstrates, failure to consider functional jurisdiction or discriminate 
among the different dimensions of authority risks frustrating efforts to 
promote public goals or unnecessarily sacrificing complementary values. 
The appropriate balance among competing goals or values inevitably 
must be struck contextually.355  Nevertheless, it may be useful to provide 
some tentative generalizations on how the relative merits of dimensional 
allocations of authority are likely to differ by function.  Additionally, a 
consideration of how functional jurisdiction may generally interface with 
the various dimensions of authority suggests novel opportunities to 
maximize the advantages of a particular dimensional allocation while 
minimizing its risks.  In this conclusion, we begin by providing a few 
preliminary observations regarding likely general tendencies in the 
allocation of authority. 
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Coordinating or Centralizing Research, Information Dissemination, 
and Financing.  In general, arguments for centralization and coordination 
are likely to be stronger for scientific research, information organization 
and distribution, and financing than for other governmental functions.  
Centralization may frequently be a way to overcome collective action 
problems, such as the incentives for each governmental entity to free ride 
on the efforts of others, assuming information accumulated by one agency 
will be shared with others. 356   In addition, centralization (or 
coordination) 357  can produce administrative efficiencies by reducing 
duplication of effort.  On the other hand, the experimentation and diversity 
benefits of decentralizing scientific research and particularly the collating 
and distribution of information are likely to be more muted.   
One factor in determining whether to centralize on the one hand or 
decentralize and coordinate on the other might be the likelihood of 
innovation by multiple governmental authorities.  The more valuable 
innovations are likely to be, the less advantages centralization is likely to 
offer.  The analysis of accumulated information, for example, may benefit 
from the experimentation and expertise benefits of decentralization, as 
multiple agencies may interpret the same data in different ways or devise 
different strategies for acting on that data, reducing the risk of groupthink 
that prevents innovative action that may promote values such as 
effectiveness. 358   Assuming some level of decentralization, the choice 
between overlapping or distinct authority might often be made by 
comparing the efficiency gains of distinct authority with the redundancy 
advantages of overlap.   
The value of centralizing the scientific research and information 
dissemination functions has been recognized in a variety of regulatory 
contexts.  In the environmental area, as Daniel Esty has explained, 
delegating these functions to state and local regulators will tend to weaken 
technical capacity and forfeit economies of scale, particularly because the 
nature of many scientific and technical questions will be the same 
regardless of jurisdiction.359  In the field of national security, the costs of 
harmonizing state and local data collection efforts may be high, and trust 
in the accuracy of shared information may be greater if it is accumulated 
                                                 
356
 See, e.g., Eric T. Laity, The Corporation as Administrative Agency: Tax Expenditures 
and Institutional Design, 28 VA. TAX REV. 411, 455 (2008). 
357
 See, e.g., Marisam, supra note 20, at 26-27 (arguing that while “the risk of free riding 
is substantial when Congress assigns the same tasks to multiple agencies,” that risk “is 
diminished when each agency contributes different information or performs different 
subtasks”). 
358
 See O’Connell, supra note 1, at 1676.   
359
 Esty, Environmental Federalism, supra note 6, at 614-15. 
70  
FUNCTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN 3-D 
[30-Mar-13 
 
centrally.360  Similarly, because “healthcare regulation . . . has become 
increasingly objectivist and data-driven . . . , the greatest need is not for 
voice or diversity . . . but rather for scale to gather reliable data.”361 In 
addition, the federal government may have incentives to accumulate health 
care data that lower levels of government lack, creating collective action 
problems in a decentralized information-gathering regime.362 
As with scientific research and information distribution, collective 
action problems generally appear to provide a strong justification for 
centralizing the financing function for many substantive jurisdictional 
areas.  States and localities will often lack incentives to invest in 
intelligence and national security functions, for example, because the risks 
of inadequate surveillance may be externalized if terrorist activity is 
conducted in locations different from where they are planned, and some 
jurisdictions may regard themselves as at low risk.  In addition, the 
political flack of ineffective counterterrorism measures tends to be borne 
by the federal government.363  Finally, the federal government generally 
will have superior capacity to finance regulatory programs.364 
Of course, the appropriate allocation of authority is likely to differ for 
other types of information gathering.  In contrast to scientific research, 
information distribution, and financing, the arguments for decentralization 
are likely to be stronger for various monitoring activities, particularly of 
localized conditions in fields of regulation such as environmental 
protection.  Knowledge of local pollution sources and conditions will 
often provide a stronger justification for decentralized monitoring of 
current levels of pollution, for example, than exists for the accumulation 
and analysis of information on matters such as the degree of exposure to a 
particular pollutant that creates unacceptable levels of health risk. 365  
Similarly, there frequently may be advantages to vesting in lower levels of 
government the task of determining the effect of regulated activity such as 
pollution on local populations, especially local concentrations of 
vulnerable or disadvantaged groups.  Even in these circumstances, 
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however, sound reasons likely remain for coordinating information 
distribution systems among governmental authorities, or even centralizing 
the distribution function in a dedicated authority.  Again, context matters 
in getting the functional allocation right. 
Decentralizing and Coordinating Distinct Planning Authority.  The 
case for decentralized but coordinated planning generally seems stronger 
than for other governmental functions.  Superior knowledge of location-
specific needs and conditions may often support delegating planning 
responsibilities to regional or local branches of federal agencies366 or to 
lower levels of government. 367   In addition, the experimentation and 
learning benefits of planning by many agencies would frequently support 
decentralization.  Conversely, economies of scale are likely to be more 
difficult to achieve when planners must consider localized conditions in 
detail and the issues are not entirely or even largely national in character, 
reducing the value of centralization. 
Assuming some level of decentralized planning authority is deemed 
appropriate, policymakers also must consider how to situate that authority 
along the overlap and coordination axes.  Because overlapping planning 
jurisdiction creates the potential for inconsistent mandates, planning 
would appear to often be a good candidate for establishing an allocation of 
substantively distinct authority.  Regardless of whether authority is 
overlapping or distinct, coordinated planning requirements may be 
essential to avoid disastrous results like those experienced in the responses 
to Hurricane Katrina. 368   If, for example, the federal government is 
responsible for providing food and water to populations affected by 
national disasters, they would need to know where local authorities are 
planning to move at-risk populations.369  As compared to the value of 
harmonization, the value of competition among agencies may be relatively 
small at the planning stage.  The risk of holdouts, one of the anti-commons 
problems associated with excessive coordination,370 might be minimized 
in some circumstances by authorizing the federal government to take over 
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the planning function if a state or locality fails to bear its fair share of the 
planning burden.371 
Decentralizing Independent Implementation and Enforcement.  
Though increased inter-jurisdictional coordination may often make more 
sense for functions such as ambient monitoring, financing, and planning, 
maintenance of regulator independence for implementation and 
enforcement may more frequently be beneficial.  Arguments for 
decentralizing implementation and enforcement of regulatory programs 
will likely be even more persuasive than for the planning function.  
Decentralized authority allows for a range of management strategies in 
implementation, which should facilitate the development of specialized 
approaches tailored to local variations and circumstances.  Furthermore, 
maintaining decentralized implementation and enforcement should 
continue to provide opportunities for regulatory experimentation.  
Diversity and experimentation benefits have often been cited as 
justifications for decentralizing implementation and enforcement activities 
in diverse regulatory areas such as environmental,372 energy,373 and health 
care policy.374  Additionally, collective action problems may be less likely 
to arise from decentralized implementation and enforcement than for other 
functions, particularly when information gathering, financing and standard 
setting are centralized and/or coordinated.375  
Reducing Functional Overlap in Conjunction with Stronger 
Coordination.  Though we largely agree with the literature asserting that 
overlapping substantive jurisdiction provides a number of benefits, 376 
instituting redundant governmental authority for every function is unlikely 
to be valuable except in rare circumstances.  Although shared regulatory 
authority coalesced around particular substantive areas may often make 
sense, in many circumstances such jurisdictional redundancy may better 
be strategically focused on certain governmental functions (such as 
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implementation and enforcement) than characterized by perfunctory 
duplication when there are few likely redundancy benefits (such as in 
information dissemination).  Thus, it often may be valuable to reduce 
overlap in functional jurisdiction even as shared substantive jurisdiction is 
maintained or increased.   
Such reductions in functional overlap may often be usefully 
accompanied by the establishment of formal, strong coordination 
mechanisms among the agencies sharing substantive authority.  That 
configuration would help ensure that functionally distinct authorities are 
administered more efficiently and effectively.  Such a combined 
reorganization strategy may reduce the inefficiencies commonly 
associated with overlap, while maintaining some of the effectiveness and 
accountability benefits available through the coordination of shared 
substantive governance.   
Whether these allocational configurations generally represent the 
optimal balance of competing values should be tested by further analysis 
and experimentation in specific regulatory contexts.  What is already clear 
is that when Congress and other policymakers contemplate creating new 
agencies or reorganizing existing ones, they should compare different 
ways of structuring agency authority to assess which ones best address the 
concerns that prompted the desire to create or reorganize agency 
programs.  In doing so, they should take into account both the full range of 
dimensions along which authority may be structured, as well as the 
relative merits of dimensional allocations of authority that differ by 
governmental function.  Policymakers may be able to achieve more while 
losing less, for example, by coordinating existing overlapping agency 
authority rather than by centralizing it.  Further, policymakers should 
consider whether a shift in functional as opposed to substantive 
jurisdiction would better promote values such as effectiveness, efficiency, 
legitimacy, and fairness. 
